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Chapter One: The Climb
Section one

ThePhaedrus is a deeply enigmatic work,mixing the solid logic ofthe dialectic

with the dreamlike, magical power inherent in figurative language. Plato refracts the light
oftruth through a prism ofmetaphor, sending breath-taking fragments ofmeaning
shimmering across the wall ofthe mind. These beautiful images enlighten the reader as

they entice her farther into the quest for Platonic absolutes. With the help ofmetaphor,he
shatters an abstract concept into its shimmering, elusive,component parts,finally

selectively reassembling the pieces to produce for the reader a clearer understanding of
both parts and whole. This towering work by Plato retains its seductive power through the
millennia because successive generations ofreaders never feel quite finished explaining it.
Not only is the subject open to wide interpretation, but the structure, style, and mode of
presentation are equally difficult to pin down. What amazes one about this work is that

there is always something seemingly fresh for a new reader to look at. Plato's stunning
literary achievement retains its original vitality and,ifanything,grows more wonderful
with each successive interpretation.

ThePhaedrus,despite its elusive qualities, stands today as one ofthe definitive

examples left by the ancient Greeks ofthe highly-regarded teaching(and learning)style
utilizing unbiased intellectual inquiry and known as the dialectic. This teaching style stands
on a foundation ofpersonal humility. We are all—teachers as well as students—still seeking
answers to questions about the meaning oflife and how to best live out the individual

portions allotted to us. Plato'sPhaedrus continues to fascinate me as it grapples with these
problems and how they affect the basic communication skills oforal and written rhetoric.

I have in mind many questions concerning the construction ofthe Phaedrus.

What rhetorical techniques does Plato have Socrates employ? With what frequency are
they used and to what effect? First, however,to gain the foothold I seek in order to be

able to explore various features ofthe rocky,vertical face ofthePhaedrus,I plan to
construct a scaffold out ofthe work ofseveral authors who deal in various ways with the
rhetorical implications ofthe use ofmetaphor and metonymy in a text. I am convinced that
metaphor and metonymy can be demonstrated to be the fertile soil from which all

rhetorical figures grow;but combining the two,as Plato does with great gusto,can be as
tncky and dangerous as mixing water with acid. These two tropes,therefore, must receive
my primary attention. Elevated by this scaffold,I will be able to climb toward the features
in thePhaedrus that I wish to examine more closely.

My scaffolding begins with Roman Jakobson who,says David Lodge,editor of

Modern Criticism and Theory,"was one ofthe most powerful mindsin twentieth century
intellectual history"(31). One ofJakobson's major contributionsto modem literary theory,
according to Lodge,is the refinement and expansion ofa basic principle ofSaussurian

linguistics, that language,like all systems ofsigns, has a twofold character,involving two
distinct operations,selection and combination"(57). Jakobson confirms Saussure's theory
by looking at these two processes,selection and combination,and how they work,or fail
to work in people suffering from all types ofaphasia."In aphasia," according to Jakobson,
"one or the other ofthese two processes is restricted or totally blocked--an effect which

makes the study ofaphasia particularly illuminating for the linguist"(58). He goes on to
make solid connections between selection and metaphor and between combination and

metonymy. These connections are critical to his own unfolding theory.
Everyform ofaphasic disturbance consists in some impairment, more or
less severe, either ofthe faculty for selection and substitution or for
combination and contexture. The former affliction involves a deterioration

ofmetalinguistic operations,while the latter damagesthe capacity for

maintaining the hierarchy oflinguistic units. The relation ofsimilarity is

suppressed in the former,the relation ofcontiguity in the latter type of

aphasia. Metaphor is alien to the similarity disorder,and metonymy to the
contiguity disorder.(57)

From here,Jakobson takes his theory one step further by deeming these two ways
ofadvancing discourse to be polar opposites,because he believes they are at opposite
ends ofthe communication spectrum. He gives compelling reinforcement to his polar

theory by illustrations dealing with the two extreme types ofaphasia and how they affect
the processes ofmetaphor and metonymy in the individual.

In one type,the mental faculty for selection and substitution is impaired,in which
case we see the sufferer relying almost exclusively on metonymical thinking to facilitate

communication.People with this type ofaphasia are heavily dependent on contiguity to
advance their communication because,as Jakobson says,their metalinguistic operations no
longer work and they aren't able to select the word they wish to use. He gives the
example ofa patient who,when asked to repeat the word "no," replied,"No,I can't do it."

Lodge explains that context enabled him to use the word that he could not consciously
'select'from an abstract paradigm"(Lodge 78).
In the opposite type ofaphasia,the faculty for combination and contexture is

affected by the disease, and the sufferer builds communication totally on metaphoric
principles. Communicationfrom a patient with this type ofaphasia is characterized by
chaotic word order and what Jakobson calls quasi-metaphoric expressions because the
patients select inappropriate words(the wrong word from the right category)with no
deliberate intention to effect a transfer ofmeaning as do people using metaphors
rhetorically(78).

In each case,the lack ofcommand over one ofthe polar processes ofdiscourse

advancement catapults the aphasic patient toward the other pole,leaving us with

convincing evidence to support Jakobson's theory that all human communication processes
are forwarded along one ofthese two lines, metaphor or metonymy,and that they are,
indeed,located at opposite ends ofa spectrum.

By synthesizing the Saussurian principle and his studies ofaphasia,Jakobson is

able to support convincingly his theory."One topic may lead to another either through
their similarity or through their contiguity. The metaphoric way would be the most

appropriate term for the first case and the metonymic way for the second,since they find
their most condensed expression in metaphor and metonymy respectively"(58).Ifwe
think about this claim and about how metaphor and metonymy work,we can see that

contiguity is a linear process,but similarity is not. This insight will have important
consequences when we look at Plato's Phaedrus.

Jakobson goes on to argue that this polar configuration ofmetaphor and
metonymy seems to influence not only all verbal behavior, but all human behavior."A

competition between both devices, metonymic and metaphoric,is manifest in any symbolic
process, be it interpersonal or social"(60). Finally, he discusses the implications for art
and psychology and shows us in depth how the dichotomy affects literature.

"Romanticism," he believes,"is closely linked with metaphor,whereas the equally intimate
ties ofrealism with metonymy usually remain unnoticed"(60).
The bottom level ofmy theoretical scaffolding is now in place thanks to Jakobson.

Lines ofsimilarity(exemplified by metaphor)and lines ofcontiguity(exemplified by
metonymy)are seen to be the two fundamental methods which can be used to advance

human communication from one topic to another,and Jakobson has demonstrated,as
well,that they are polar opposites. However,as I add my next level ofscaffolding aided

by David Lodge,we will find that,as with other dichotomies,the lines between metaphor
and metonymy are sometimes blurry.

Section Two

David Lodge devotes several chapters ofThe ModesofModem Writing to

explanation and clarification ofJakobson's polar theory ofmetaphor and metonymy.
Lodge also begins with Saussure's idea that language,like other symbolic systems,hastwo

essential steps: selection and combination. Then,in order to further our understanding of
this concept,he introduces Roland Barthes'explanation ofhow these two steps work.
Barthes draws a parallel between dressing and writing,showing us that we must first

select an array ofgarments,one from each ofseveral categories. We need one skirt, one
shirt, one pair ofshoes and socks,etc.. This corresponds to our selection ofindividual
words from the categories containing their synonyms. We then combine the selected

pieces into a predetermined "look," or fashion statementjust as we combine the selected
words into a coherent sentence.

"Selection," says Lodge,"involves the perception ofsimilarity and it implies the
possibility ofsubstitution"(75). This,ofcourse, makes it look exactly like metaphor. John

R. Searle,in his book.Expression andMeaning,examines metaphor from the closelyreasoned point ofview ofa linguistic philosopher. He discusses the whole range of

similarity found in different metaphorsfrom the simple tenor is vehicle("S isP")variety to
the more complex types that imply that S and P share a certain range of R values and

shows us that in every case,some degree ofsimilarity is crucial to the success ofmetaphor
(103).Plato,as a master ofmetaphor,makes use ofthe whole spectrum ofmetaphor,
simply adding supplemental explanation by complicating or extending his metaphor when
the tenor gets too far from the vehicle to be readily understood.

Lodge also shows us that combination involves the perception ofcontiguity and

implies the possibility ofdeletion. Here,we have metonymy. Deletion functions as a means
ofselective compression.By carefully deleting the words we find extraneous or

inappropriate to the effect we have chosen to convey,we tighten the control over our

discourse and give our metonymical writing more power through exact expression.
Consider again Barthes clothing metaphor.Ifa woman who usually wears a three-strand
necklace ofpearls decides to select her clothes to conform with the grunge look,she must
either delete the necklace or send a mixed-up message in her total fashion statement.

Therefore,we can see that the skills ofselecting(metaphor)and combining(metonymy)
are,indeed,settling into Jakobson's categories ofpolar opposites.

Without Barthes'metaphoric illustration comparing dressing to communicating,it
is difficult to keep the concepts ofmetaphor and metonymyfrom mingling in our minds.
Lodge says,"Superficially,they seem to be the same sort ofthing-figurative
transformations ofliteral statements. Metonymy...seem[s]to involve,like metaphor,the

substitution ofone term for another"(76). He points out,however,that Jakobson "argues
that they are opposed,hQcm^Q generated according to opposite principles"(76).Barthes'
illustration demonstrates,Ithink,the opposition ofthe principles ofgeneration and,
therefore, ofthe two figures as well.

Lodge further clarifies the distinction between metaphor and metonymy by giving
us an example ofhow metonymy,the more elusive pole,functions. He begins with a
sentence,"The keels ofthe ships crossed the deep ocean"(75). He then shortens it to
"Keels crossed the deep," explaining that here we see the combination and deletion

process at work. The word 'keels'is chosen to function as the subject not because it is

similar to ship,but because it is a representative part ofthe ship(technically this
substitution is a S5mecdoche,but Jakobson and others make no distinction because it

functionsin the same way metonymy does,through combination and contexture). The

word'deep'is chosen not because it is a synonym for ocean,but because it is one ofthe
properties ofan ocean(76). Therefore,it is clear that'keel'and'deep'are chosen to be

kept and not deleted for reasons otherthan properties ofsimilarity. They are actually
related or connected to the parent words'ship'and'ocean'in an entirely different(and
contiguous)way than are the metaphorical building blocks oftenor and vehicle. Lodge's
illustration helps usto better grasp the delicate difference between the fimctioning of
metaphor and metonymy.

Lodge now begins to demonstrate the metonymic overtones found in severalforms

of expression such as prose(especially realistic prose),film,and naturalistic drama. Since
I wish to argue that PlatosPhaedrus is constructed on a metonymic fi'amework,I will
pursue Lodge's line ofreasoning using naturalistic drama as one example.In fact,the

Phaedrus might even be called a kind ofnaturalistic drama using Lodge's criteria. Lodge
says,"In naturalistic drama,every action is realistically motivated,dramatic time is almost

indistinguishable from real time...and the characters are set in a contextual space bounded
and filled with real objects"(82). Also, Lodge puts film in the same category even though
it is capable ofemploying metaphoric devices."This verisimilitude can be explained as a
function ofthe metonymic character ofthe film medium. We move through time and space
literally and our sensory experience is a succession ofcontiguities"(84). Lodge
emphasizes and re-emphasizesthe fact that realism isforwarded by contiguity and is
therefore metonymic.Ifwelook at thePhaedrus we can see immediately the realistic,
metonymic framework.

The text movesforward by means ofa contiguous storyline involving the
encounter ofPhaedrus and Socrates one hot summer morning outside the city walls. They
turn offthe road and walk along the Ilissus, a small stream,sometimes wading in the cool
water since they are both barefoot. They talk asthey walk along the brook stopping in the

shade ofa large plane tree where they sit, relax,and continue their discussion. Socrates

describes the setting minutely and sensually. The plane tree,under which they sit,is lofty
and spreading,and there is a tall willow nearby which is in full bloom,filling the air with
its fragrance. The brook is pleasing to the eye as it flows by,and the water is cool to the

bare foot. There is a light breeze,and the cicadas are chirping,but,best ofall,the grass is
thick and inviting to sit or lie on. There are also figurines and statues placed about,leading
Socratesto speculate that they have chosen to sit in a place that is sacred to some nymphs.
The description ofthe setting is vivid and realistic enough to meet the strictest of
metonymic requirements as Lodge sets them forth. The actions ofboth men are

realistically motivated,and the characters are moving through a believable landscape filled
with familiar objects. Also,the time frame is realistic since all ofthe dialogue takes place
in the space ofone day,stretching,I calculate,from late morning to mid-afternoon. So,
although there are frequent and lengthy breaks in the action ofthePhaednis because

Plato's copious use ofrhetorical devices such as myth and metaphor retard the flow ofthe
realistic portions ofthe text,I still feeljustified in arguing that Plato'sPhaedrus has a
metonymic framework.

The rhetorical breaks are potentially troublesome,however.Lodge warns that in

realistic literature,effective metaphor is subject to strictures unique to a clearly
metonymical genre.In an environment where metaphor is comfortable,like poetry,the
greater the distance between tenor and vehicle,the more creative fizzis produced.
However,the distance which works so effectively in metaphorical genres tends to

undermine metonymical works by disrupting the contiguity in direct proportion to the
distance between tenor and vehicle(112).He says that"We would expect the writer who
is working in the metonymic mode to use metaphorical devices sparingly"(113),and he

even suggests that similes, which have less distance between tenor and vehicle, may be a

more prudent choice offigure for the metonymical writer.

Clearly,Plato flagrantly disregards this piece ofadvice that comes 2,500 years too
late. He nails weighty metaphorical devices showing great distance between tenor and
vehicle all over his slender metonymicalframework in thePhaedrus,and I shall offer some

possible reasons for Plato's ability to make this departurefrom the norm a viable strategy.
One reason may lie in the peculiar attraction that these two polar opposites have for each

other. They do not always seem to repel each other,and they are not always mutually
exclusive. When they enter each other's magnetic fields,they can work together to form
one ofthe most sophisticated figures ofspeech,the symbol,which Lodge describes as"a
kind ofmetaphorical metonymy"(100).Plato makes heavy use ofsymbols in the

Phaedrus,thus uniting Jakobson's polar opposites. Take,for example,thefamous myth of
the soulin Socrates'second speech.In it, Socrates likens falling in love to growing
feathers on the soul. This makes little sense until we remember Socrates'description
earlier in the same speech ofsouls striving to fly higher and higher in an attemptto catch a
glimpse oftruth or reality. Socrates gives Phaedrus a lengthy description ofthe growth of
feathers on the soul ofthe lover. To me,the feathers seem to be a clearly contiguous

metonymicalimage used to indicate wings,which,in turn,are used to indicate the ability
to fly, which is metaphorically like the improvement the soul undergoes when falling in
love. Thus,we can see that there is a remarkable power ofexpression in the intertwining
ofthe polar opposites,and Plato takes full advantage ofthis power.
Lodge also does a nice piece ofanalysis concerning the literary uses and

effectiveness ofthese strangely intertwined polar opposites, metaphor and metonymy;
No message that is decoded without effort is likely to be valued, and the

metaphoric mode has its own way ofmaking interpretation fiuitfiilly
difficult: though it offers itselfeagerly for interpretation,it bewilders us

with a plethora ofpossible meanings. The metonymic text,in contrast,
deluges us with a plethora ofdata, which we seek to unite into one
meaning. Furthermore,it must always be remembered that we are not

discussing a distinction between two mutually exclusive types ofdiscourse,

but a distinction based on dominance. The metaphoric work cannot totally
neglect metonymic continuity ifit is to be intelligible at all.

Correspondingly,the metonymic text cannot eliminate all signs that it is
available for metaphorical interpretation.(Ill)

Clearly,Jakobson's polar opposites ofmetaphor and meton5miy are not entirely

incompatible. They can provide each other with a needed balance. Whenjudiciously
combined,one provides the dominantflavor and the other adds subtle zest as a seasoning.
With these considerations in mind,I think we can see that Plato has good reason to

include metaphorical techniques in his metonymical text. The problem lies only in the
number and length ofthese interruptions. What does Plato stand to gain by using

metaphorical devices so frequently? Do the benefits outweigh the risk offragmenting the
metonymical framework? We will soon find out.

Section Three

Now we move on to the third and final level ofscaffolding with the work of

Northrop Frye who,in The Great Code, discusses and extends an intriguing idea first
advanced by Giambattista Vice.

According to Vico,Frye writes,there are three ages in a cycle ofhistory: a
mythical age,or age ofgods;a heroic age,or age ofan aristocracy; and an
age of the people, after which comes the ricorso or return that starts the

10

whole process over again.Each age produces its own kind o^langage,
giving us three types ofverbal expression that Vico calls, respectively,the
poetic,the heroic or noble,and the vulgar, and which I shall call the

hieroglyphic,the hieratic,and the demotic. These terms refer primarily to
three modes ofwriting...(5)

Frye later enlarges on these three eras,eventually calling the first,second and third ages
metaphoric, metonymic and descriptive, which is why his work is crucial to my preliminary
scaffolding.

Frye emphasizes that these ages are not a progression moving from lower to higher

forms.Each form has its advantages and disadvantages.Furthermore,humanity ultimately
ends up,albeit modified,where they started since the process is circular. Vico describes

the hieroglyphic/metaphoric stage as characterized by a poetic use oflanguage. Frye
explains. In this period there is relatively little emphasis on a clear separation of subject
and object;the emphasis falls rather on the feeling that subject and object are linked by a
common power or energy"(6). This common energy linking the subject and object

describes,ofcourse,the essence ofmetaphor,and it seems only natural that this phase
should come first in human history at a time when the very concept ofwords standing for
things must have been stunning and magical.Indeed,Frye says that"A corollary ofthis
principle is that there may be a potential magic in any use ofwords. Words in such a
context are words ofpower or dynamic forces"(6).

Plato intimates through his pharmakon metaphor in thePhctsdrus that such a

mysterious power does exist and must be used with care. Jacqueline de Romilly,m Magic
andRhetoric in Ancient Greece,is fascinated with this concept ofmagic in words which
was so potent at the dawn ofthe metonymic age and still often seems real to me. She

tightens the focus to the magic offormal rhetoric. "But I am sure the problem ofthe

11

relationship between magic and rhetoric in ancient Greece exists and has a meaning"(3).
She goes on to acknowledge that magic and rhetoric have the same kind ofmetaphorical
relationship as pharmakon and rhetoric. As any good witch doctor knows,magic and
medicine have similar, mysterious powersto do either great harm or great good,and a
practiced user ofwords recognizes this same weird power in rhetoric. Plato makes

extensive use ofthe drug/rhetoric metaphor throughout thePhaedrus. In fact,Jacques
Derrida,in Dissemincition,argues that the dominating figure ofspeech throughout the
Phaedrusis the pharmakon metaphor(65). Gorgias also,according to Romilly,made use

ofboth magic and pharmakon metaphors to describe rhetoric in the Helen(20). Magic
seems to have the same great potential both for good and evil that we find in drugs.Drugs
are more concrete and less elusive than magic,but the element ofmysterious and

fiightening power is the same in both,and each provides a vivid metaphor when compared
with rhetoric. Furthermore,I believe that the science ofmedicine has close ties with magic
in that they both work partially through the power ofsuggestion. The relationship of
medieine and magie to rhetoric, especially close in ancient times,is still obvious to me.

While Vico confined his original theory to types ofwriting,Frye implies that it has

a potentialfor much broader application. After all,interpretation ofthe subject and object
as being intimately and mysteriously linked is a mindset,a way ofviewing the whole world

as being magically and intimately interconnected. Although this way ofseeing things
seems rather primitive to usfrom our vantage point in the starkly scientific "descriptive
phase" ofthe cycle,there is yet something appealing about it. Perhaps we are not the
purely rational, empirical scientists studying the causes and eflfect ofall other forms of

matter. Maybe we are not the masters who control it all, but only interconnected

insignifieant specks in the midst ofthis vast panorama. The lure ofmetaphorical thinking
may be moving us around the circle since Frye beheves that we may be entering another
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metaphorical cycle right now.

After the age ofmetaphor,says Frye,came the age ofmetonymy,and he places
Plato squarely at the dawn ofthe new era. IfHomer,with his deeply poetic and
metaphorical epics stands as afigurehead in the first era,then Plato, with his carefully
reasoned dialectic occupies that position in the second,or metonymical era.

Frye thinks that there are three main meaningsfor the word metonymic. "First,it
is a figure ofspeech in which a word is'put for'another image." This,he thinks,is a

species ofmetaphor,but I disagree with him here because ofwhat Jakobson and Lodge
have shown about how the process ofmaking metaphors is based on similarity and the
process ofmaking metonyms is based on contiguity. Frye's second meaning is "a mode of

analogical thinking and writing in which the verbal expression is'put for'something that by
definition transcends adequate verbal expression." This definition figures deeply in the
works ofPlato,almost in a sense defining them andjustifying his place as the figurehead
or spokesman for the metonymic era. The third meaning is"a mode ofthought and speech
in which the word is'putfor'the object it describes"(15). This is the flatly descriptive
language ofthe scientist, utilizing no colorful figures ofspeech.

Although Plato uses metonymic language in all three ways,he makes very heavy
use ofthe second,or analogical method in thePhaedrus in order to explain what he
means by "truth." Therefore I contend that thePhaedrus is not only built on a
metonymical linear framework as Lodge says is true of most works ofrealism,but is also

buttressed by analogical metonymy and trimmed with the two types of'put for'metonymy.
However,as solidly metonymical as thePhaedrus now seems,it is shot through with
show-stopping metaphorical devices which we will soon begin to examine. My question
remains as to why Plato would use these devices so liberally,ignoring their potential to
interfere with the inertia or forward momentum established by the metonymical
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framework.

Frye believes that ifthe metaphorical age is characterized by little separation
between subject and object,"In this second phase language is more individualized and

words become primarily the outward expression of inner thoughts or ideas. Subject and
object are becoming more consistently separated and 'reflection,' with its overtones of

looking into a mirror, movesinto the verbalforeground"(7). Plato advocates one activity
above all else;it is this reflection,this meditation,this looking inward in pursuit oftruth.
Although he has Socrates espouse these ideas with measured tact and delicacy in the
Phaedrus,there remainsthe slight odor offanaticism in the text. For a man who humbly
professes to know nothing, Socrates holds surprisingly dogmatic views on the subject of
truth,and this,I think,comesfrom Plato's historical situation on the cusp between the
metaphorical and metonymical eras.

Frye says that"What Homeric heroes revolve in their bosoms is an inseparable

mixture ofthought and feeling; what Socrates demonstrates,more especially in his death,
is the superior penetration ofthought when it is in command offeeling"(7). Being
controlled by emotion gives one the feeling ofbeing swept away,ofactually being out of

control or being controlled by outside forces. This is what happens when normally rational

individuals spontaneously bond into a mob and run amuck.If, however,thoughts are in
control,ones actions will be more deliberate and planned, more autonomous,and

hopefully,they will be wiser.Humans are not bom knowing how to think critically and
reason independently; and indeed, most ofus are controlled by our emotions to a much

greater degree than we care to admit. But the works ofPlato,written at the very dawn of

the metonymic era when humans were beginning to use language in a way that suggested
they werelearmng to think ofthemselves as individuals with a measure offree will, still
stand as one ofthe best guides for anyone wishing to travelfurther down the path ofself
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knowledge.

Frye may be right in saying that there is no qualitative difference among Vico's

ages when they are looked at exclusively as ways ofwriting,but ifwe look at the types of
lifestyles that these metaphorical and metonymical mindsets foster,then I have to agree
with Plato that there is a huge qualitative difference. People who mix up their thoughts
and feelings, as did the Homeric heroes in the metaphorical era,have a lower degree of
differentiation,or individuation. They see themselves as having fewer choices,less chance
to exert some kind ofpersonal control over their lives. Plato believed strongly that the

more highly differentiated people are,the more they assume responsibility for their life
choices,the more ofa credit they will be to themselves and to their societies. Plato lived in

an age when most people were poorly differentiated(as,frankly,we still are today),and

he was a positively evangelical advocate ofdifferentiation or autonomy which is largely
gained through introspection. Dialectic,he thought,stimulated thoughts that led people in
the direction ofdifferentiation,but both rhetoric and writing,which were extremely
powerful persuaders and could pull people in either direction, were not altogether
trustworthy. In the souls swayed by them,they were capable ofproducing either great

good or irreparable harm depending on whether their appeal was based on truth and reality
or on supposition and popular opinion.

And here we are at the top ofour scaffolding and ready to examine thePhaedms.

We have looked at metaphor and metonymy in ever widening definitions and,hopefully,

have gotten an understanding ofhow they function as polar opposites and yet eerily
intertwine to form the most magical ofall figures,symbols. We have seen how they stand
as twin sentinels ofhuman communication, marking the end-points ofthe spectrum,and
how they can logically be used to name and describe two successive historical eras. We

have examined Plato's commitment to the search for self-knowledge which fuels his
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dialectic with the faltering Phaedms and makes it necessary for him to dazzle us with a
masterful array ofrhetorical weapons with which he fights his war for truth. From this

height it will be easy to reach the promontory ofthePhaedrm and at last begin our

rhetorical analysis. Throughout my thesis,unless otherwise specified,I shall be referring to
the translation ofthePhaedrus found in The Rhetorical Tradition:Readingsfrom
Classical Times to the Present.
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Chapter Two: The Analysis
Section One

Given what we now know about metaphor and metonymy,we can ask ourselves

with a certain degree ofconviction why Plato chose to cut across his metonymic text and
interrupt itsflow so often and so deeply,by employing the closely related figurative
devices ofmetaphor and myth. His overall strategy is metonymic. ThePhaedrusis framed

and advanced by a more or less realistic account ofan encounter between two fiiends,one
naive and self-indulgent,the other rich in wisdom and self-knowledge, yetPlato deviates
often and sweepingly from the metonymicformat by breaking the continuity ofthe realistic
story line with myths,speeches,prayers and extended metaphors. The story line itself

derives its metonymical flow from description and a rich,smooth mix ofdialogue. What
did Plato accomplish by not choosing to stay with the elegance ofcontiguous
advancement built upon the firm foundation ofhis metonymical frame? What did such
repeated andjarring deviation from the norm that he,himselfhad established achieve?

Ifthe overall framework ofthePhaedrus can be said to be metonymical,then the
overall strategy can be defined as dialectical. The dialectic is an intensive, arduous and

sometimes painful teaching strategy developed by Plato. It "requires ofits readers[or
listeners]a searching and rigorous scrutiny ofeverything they believe in and live by," says
Stanley Fish in Self-ConsumingArtifacts(1),and results ideally in "nothing less than a
conversion"(2). Fish points out that the relationship established in a dialectic is "less one

ofspeaker to hearer,or author to reader than ofphysician to patient,and it is as the'good
physician'that the dialectician is traditionally knoAvn"(2). It makes good sense for a

dialectician/physician to use repeatedly a medical metaphor,as Plato does. The pharmakon
metaphor is repeated throughout the text in many different guises to produce the
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understanding that writing,like a powerful drug,is capable ofproducing either beneficial
or harmful results. However,"physician" comes close to being too strong a word to make

a good comparison with dialectician,implying,as it does,a person with great knowledge
imparting healing to a person who is suffering from an illness.

In Self-Knowledge in Plato'sPhaedms.Charles L. Griswold Jr. emphasizes the

dialectic teachers search for self-knowledge.In an ideal dialectic,the student isn't the only
one to gain in understanding. The teacher is also a seeker ofknowledge(28). Although
the dialectical physicians are more advanced than the patients along the path toward truth,
they retain the humility ofphilosophers because they see how much they do not know.
This often happens to people pursuing higher education. The more we learn,the greater

becomes our understanding ofthe vast fields ofknowledge that we have not yet reached.
Ironically,this understanding meansthat the most learned people are usually the most
humble,as well as being the most hungry for new enlightenment.In the dialectic mode of

inquiry,the teachers are notjust teaching,but actively exploring and seeking deeper
understanding for their own benefit as well as the students'.

At the beginning ofthe dialogue,Phaedrus is a man being drawn into a web of

self-deceit through the rhetorical powers ofLysias and his kind. His soul is sick because of

the trickery and falsehood which formsthe underpinnings ofthe popular rhetoric purveyed
by Lysias His illness demands a healer ifhe is to be saved,and Plato casts Socrates in the

role ofthe wise physician who hasthe power to save Phaedrus. Socrates,by exploring his
own ideas in the light ofthe stated opinions and beliefs ofPhaedrus,will also gain a
greater degree ofenlightenment and satisfaction as do physicians when they successfully
treat a stubborn illness. Both doctor and patient are helped,each on a different level of
awareness.

Platos choice ofthe dialectic teaching strategy,set like a gem in the larger prose
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dialogue ofthePhaedrus,also explains in part why he feels it necessary to sacrifice the

smooth continuity ofhis metonymical text to the impetuous,interruptive pace ofmetaphor
and myth. In describing a successful dialectical investigation. Fish says that "it will be

unpredictable and to some degree haphazard,since the turns ofthe argument,its advances
and backslidings, will vary according to the degree to which the minds involved are in

bondage to the realm ofsensibles"(7).Plato has Socrates,the'good physician,'fashion the
pharmakon ofrhetoric into a beneficial type ofdrug,the dialectic. As he suits the

prescription to the degree ofreadiness in Phaedrus,the metonymicform must often be

sacrificed in order to slip a metaphoric pill between the lips ofthe patient. Derrida,in
"White Mythology," says,"Whoever studies[Plato's metaphors]quickly perceives that

they are not simply ornaments,but are all destined to express ideas more aptly than would
a long elaboration"(221)~and,I would say,more subtly,concisely and interestingly,
making them the perfect example ofa beneficial pharmakon.

Plato,using Socrates as his agent,pursues a hidden agenda in this text, which is no

less than attempting to heal his patient who is sick from trivial discourse ofhalf-truths by
the timely administration ofan antidote in the form ofa dialectical search for truth. Jack

Goody and Ian Watt,in The ConsequencesofLiteracy, mention that "Plato is essentially
an heir ofthe long Greek enterprise oftrying to sort out truth,episteme, from current

opinion,doxa"(53). This concept ofcurrent opinion,later defined as"probability," is
defended by the sophists on the grounds that there is no such thing as absolute truth. Our
quest,ifwe have one,should be a search for expediency,not universal truth. The

enshrining ofpopular opinion~in opposition to Plato's concept ofabsolute truth-seems to
spring from the oral tradition which is rooted in the metaphorical era; whereas Socrates'

formulation oftruth, dealing,as it does with investigation ofan abstract concept,is
definitely a metonymical construct. Plato was highly suspicious ofthe old ways,the
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poetic, metaphoric ways ofconceptualization because he thought they led people to
accept opinion and half-truth as the highest moral authority rather than to honestly look

inside themselves and try to formulate ultimate reality or truth as their guidelinesfor
living.

In Preface to Plato, Eric Havelock says that"We can realize how this inherited

state ofmind wasfor Plato the enemy,and how he would wish to frame his own doctrine

in language which met it head on,and confronted it, and destroyed it"(266). So,we

might even call this dialogue with Phaedrus more ofan exorcism thanjust an attempt at
curing the young man. He must be wrenched from the grip ofthe magical,seductive halftruths ofLysias rhetoric,and only Socrates'equally potent dialectical magic can rescue
him. Romilly compares the two types ofmagical powers to befound in ancient rhetoric.

"Whereas the magic ofthe sophists aimed at producing illusion, Socrates'magic rests on

the obstinate destruction ofall illusions. It is the magic ofimplacable truth"(36).In order
to accomplish this healing/exorcism,Plato will arm his character, Socrates, with every
drug in the rhetorical pharmacy,the most powerful ofwhich may be the ones like
metaphor which act by momentarily stopping the flow ofthe text.

Initially, the Phaedrus we see is an impetuous,unreflective youth in need ofthe

subtle guidance at which Socrates excels.Phaedrus encounters Socrates near the city wall
after spending the morning listening to Lysias, a well-known Attic orator. He comes from

the city simply bubbling over with blind enthusiasm for a speech written and delivered by
Lysias. When he encounters Socrates,he is on his way to walk outside the city wall and to

memorize Lysias'clever,facile speech. Socratesjoins him,professing with subtle irony
equal enthusiasm and eagerness to hear about Lysias'speech. Socrates immediately
launches the pharmakon metaphor by declaring himselfto be "the man who is sick with the
love ofdiscourse"(113). Irony and metaphor,therefore, are the first rhetorical devices
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Plato has Socrates use in thePhaedrus,thereby setting the tone for the rest ofthe text.

Irony and metaphor,as well as other rhetorical devices which break the metonymic

contiguity,can be grouped under the broad heading ofconversational implicature. Georgia
M.Green,in "Some Remarks on Why there is Implicature," counts as conversational

implicature "any intentional, non-conventional use oflanguage with a reasonably
determinable specific intended import"(26).Paul Grice sheds a brighter light on
conversational implicature by formulating what he calls the Cooperative Principle.
Grice's principle,from his book.Studies in the Way of Words,sets forth the

intuitive rules on which conversation,and indeed,every form ofcommunication is based

and shows what happens ifthese rules are broken. There are three groups ofrules
pertaining to what is said, and one group dealing with how it is said.
Cooperative Principle
Quantity:

1. Make your conversational contribution as informative as required.
2. Do not make it more informative than required.
Quality:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.

2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relation:
1. Be relevant.
Manner:

1. Avoid obscurity ofexpression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief.

4. Be orderly(16).
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When a sentence is flawed by the breaking ofany ofthese rules,the listener must

assume that the speaker does not mean to have the sentence taken literally and must try to
discover what the speaker does mean. Since irony and metaphor are not literal uses of

language,they do not conform to Grice's first rule ofquality,"Do not say what you
believe to be false." They may also appear to break the relation rule as well as the first two
manner rules. Therefore,the contiguity ofthe communication must be temporarily
suspended while the listener stops and interprets the ironic or metaphorical statements.

But how is it possible to interpret communication concealing a non-literal meaning behind
a figure ofspeech with reasonable speed and accuracy so as not tojarringly disrupt the
textual contiguity?

Rong Chen,in his article "ConversationalImplicature and Poetic Metaphor,"
shows us a missing link when he interprets Grice's rules in light ofa broad field ofshared
knowledge held by both the speaker and the listener and assumed to be common

knowledge by both parties. Chen's shared-knowledge concept makes Grice's theory work
well to show us what hidden mechanisms make it possible for us to effectively translate
metaphors and related rhetorical devices which work by stopping the metonymicflow of
realistic or descriptive prose. Clearly,ifthis vast pool ofshared knowledge wasn't known
by both listener and speaker,we would be helpless to explain how metaphors
communicate successfully in the face ofa deliberately broken rule ofthe cooperative
principle. With this shared knowledge,the listener can usually interpret the metaphor
without undue delay.

But,violating the rules ofthe Cooperative Principle does put an obstruction in
front ofthe listener and stops the linear contiguity in a metonymic text. What doesPlato
accomplish by doing this? Searle discusses two possible reasons when he tries to account

for the magic that the metaphorical figure ofspeech nearly always has,and these reinforce
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what has already been said by Lodge concerning reasons for using both metaphor and
metonymy. First, says Searle,the listener has to work harder to decode the utterance when

it is metaphorical than when it is literal. This is like working to solve a puzzle,and success

brings to the listener a feeling ofgratification. Second,the listener must solve the puzzle
by going through a set ofsemantic contents(Chen's "shared knowledge")not included in

the literal utterance(116). These things bring a feeling ofaccomplishment to the listener,
the feeling ofajob well done,and refresh and reinforce the listener's interest in the

speaker's words. Therefore, metaphor may be the perfect medicine for what ails Phaedrus.
It is certainly Plato's intention to portray Phaedrus as a man who needs someone

to balance his views,ask questions and ultimately bring him to a more realistic opinion of
Lysias'speech. Initially however,he is depicted as being so uncritically enthusiastic that
Socrates knowsPhaedrus first needs someone simply to share his happiness. Socrates

carefully keeps his enthusiasm on a general level at first, not including Lysias,specifically,
but Phaedrus is satisfied,and so they arrange to spend the afternoon enjoying Lysias'
speech in the country.

Up to this point,the text advances through the temporal and spatial contiguity ofa

realistic story line;just what we expect from a metonymic work. The initial use ofirony
and metaphor are light enough not to act as a drag on the momentum ofthe story. Here,
however, we encounter the first myth ofthePhaedrus,and,as it cuts across the smooth

fabric ofmetonymy,with it comes a hint ofPlato's reasons for mixing metaphor and
metonymy.It is Phaedrus,fittingly enough,who first introduces the topic ofmyth,asking
Socrates ifthe place beside the river where they are walking is not the same place where
"Boreas is said to have carried offOreithyia"(114).Phaedrus treats the myth on a casual,
superficial level, much like rumor or gossip. With these less than honorable species of
communication,after the first gasp ofscandalized delight,the listener typically asks,"Do
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you really think this is true?"

Phaedrus slyly brings up the myth by questioning Socrates about the location of

the purported incident. Socrates tells the exact location where the event memorialized by
the myth took place,but clearly this is not what interests Phaedrus. He nearly brushes off

the answer to his first question in his haste to ask the second."But,for Heaven's sake,
Socrates,tell me;do you believe this tale is true?"(114) Phaedrus is interested only in the
salacious aspect ofthe myth: was the girl carried offand ravished by the north wind?
Socrates recognizes Phaedrus'uncritical enjoyment ofmyths as well as speeches,

and in true dialectic form,he begins subtly to take advantage ofPhaedrus'enthusiasm by
hinting at a higher purpose for myth. He gives two versions ofthe events,the mythic one
where Oreithyia was carried offand raped by Boreas,the north wind,and the realistic one

subscribed to by "the wise men"(114)in which a blast of north wind blew Oreithyia off
the rocks as she was playing with herfnend,Pharmacea. Socrates downplays the relative

truth or falsity ofboth versions ofthe myth,saying simply that since he doesn't yet even
know himself, as the Delphic inscription advises, he hasn't time "to investigate irrelevant
things"(114).

Socrates, by consciously contemplating the meaning ofthe myth in personal terms
and looking for grains ofits truth to apply to himself,is making very sophisticated and
modem use ofthe ancient mythical structure. He deliberately uses myth as a sort of
psychological mirror reflecting himself. He applies the universal human tmths found in

myths to his own personal situation to see ifthey help him gain insight into his individual

character. Phaedms,on the other hand,sees the myth as an exciting story that has nothing
to do with him.Ifhe gains anything ofvalue from the myth,it will be an unconscious gain,
not one requiring the kind ofeffort that Socrates puts forth.

"Know Thyself," says the Delphic Oracle. What an amazing command.Even for
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those ofus who live at the end ofthe twentieth century it is still the most difficult task of

all. Friedrich Nietzsche,in his essay"On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," says that
"Man has an invincible inclination to allow himselfto be deceived"(895). As easy as I find

it to allow myselfto be deceived by others,it is a thousand times easier to deceive myself.
It is so much pleasanter for me to construct,for instance,a personal identity that flatters

my conception of myselfthan to unflinchingly stare at and accept my own shortcomings
and puny strengths. How vastly more difficult it must have been for people at the dawn of
the metonymic period who had onlyjust realized that there was an individual selfto know,
and who probably often lacked training in the use ofthe newly-invented linguistic tools
necessary to express what they were trying to explain.
Socrates has a monumental task before him ifhe wishes to start this fiivolous

young man,Phaedrus,down the rocky road to self-knowledge. He begins his labor as,

with the greatest delicacy, he lifts the myth fi-om its inglorious place beside gossip and tries
to show Phaedrus that the value ofthe myth lies not in determining its truth or falsity, but
in using it to gain increased self-knowledge. Since self-knowledge is the most desirable,as
well as the most elusive goal ofall, this is the struggle on which he chooses to spend his
energy.

The search for self-knowledge is a courageous struggle toward truth, no matter

how unpalatable the final revelation ofit may be. Socrates is content to leave the myths
unexamined,concerning their properties oftruth or falsehood. Instead, he uses them to

fiirther his own quest for self-knowledge. "I investigate not these things,but myself,to
know whether I am a monster more complicated and more furious than Typhon or a
gentler and simpler creature,to whom a divine and quiet lot is given by nature"(114).
Seeking greater self-understanding, Socrates sees the value ofthe myth, whether true or

false, as holding up a mirror for self-reflection. Are we monsters or are we gentle,simple
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creatures? Or might we be both? Ifwe get tangled up in a search only for the historical

truth, we will never come close to finding this answer. The search for historical veracity
causes us to overlook the general human truth ofthis or any myth.

What do we mean when we use the magical, mysterious word, myth? Frye thinks

that"A myth is designed not to describe a specific situation but to contain it in a way that
does not restrict its significance to that one situation. Its truth is inside its structure, not
outside"(46). So when Socrates advocates using a myth to better know himself, he is
taking it out ofcontext without sacrificing the kernel oftruth which is embedded in the

structure. Myths seem to be strange,two-headed animals capable offunctioning on

conflicting levels: the superficial story level and the higher level ofa signpost pointing
toward universal truth. Frye thinks that the word myth has come to have two opposing
definitions. First, myth is popularly understood to mean that which is "not really true."
However,there is also a deeper meaning. "Mythical,in this secondary sense,therefore

means the opposite of 'not really true': it means being charged with a special seriousness
and importance"(33). Philip Wheelwright,in his entry on "myth" in The Princeton

Encyclopedia ofPoetry andPoetics also emphasizes the two meanings ofmyth,using the
term "narrative," or story,(539)in the first meaning and enlarging on the second and

deeper meaning as follows."Myth may be defined as a story or a complex ofstory
elements taken as expressing,and therefore as implicitly symbolizing,certain deep-lying
aspects ofhuman and transhuman existence"(538). Therefore,the symbol(produced by

the conjunction ofthe polar opposites ofmetaphor and metonymy)is the magic ingredient
which illustrates and gives meaning to the mythical form.

Symbols give us the best ofboth worlds: the metaphorical magic ofunseparated
subject and object as well as the sturdy analogical structure ofmetonymy that can be used
to clarify abstract concepts. And so it is the union ofthe polar opposites ofcommunication
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which strikes the spark and makes symbolic language,and,by extension, myths,so

meaningful. The powerful symbol ofthe soul growing feathers, which I earlier explained in

terms ofmetaphor and metonymy,was used by Plato to intensify the impact ofa myth
recounted in Socrates'second speech to Phaedrus. Since myths deal mainly with thejob of

making abstract concepts understandable to everyone,symbolic language is necessarily a
part ofmyth.

Plato,then,had some sound reasons,indeed,for constantly mixing the seemingly
incompatible elements ofmetaphor and metonymy.Like an ancient alchemist, he created
something precious by combining and recombining in ever varying configurations his
dichotomous ingredients.

At this point in the argument,I think we have found several parts ofour answer

to the question ofwhat Plato accomplishes by using so many myths and metaphors in his

text. Plato allows Socrates to fit the medicine to the need,and,plainly, at the beginning of
this dialogue,Phaedrus is in no mood to listen to constructive criticism concerning his
hero ofthe moment,Lysias. He does, however,demonstrate a fondness for the pretty
stories ofmyth and metaphor,as well asfor formal speeches, and Plato's Socrates sees

how these rhetorical devices can be used to further the education ofPhaedrus. Also,
according to Goody and Watt,"Plato was torn between his interest and understanding of
the prosaic, analytic and critical procedures ofthe new literate thoughtways on the one

hand,and his occasional nostalgia for the'unwritten customs and laws ofour ancestors,'

along with the poetic myths in which they were enshrined"(52). Plato makes a perfectly
logical decision to have Socrates use myths in the dialectic because oftheir beneficial

effect on Phaedrus as well as their nostalgic attraction, as Goody and Watt say,for
himself.

Plato also introduces in this first myth ofthePhaedrus the dominant metaphor of
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the entire text in his choice ofname for the little girl's companion,Pharmacea. Derrida

recognizes the recurring pharmakon metaphor but believes that throughout the text,it

refers to writing because writing is compared throughout thePhaedrus to a drug with all
ofthe potential dangers and benefits associated with pharmakon. I agree with the

dominance ofthe pharmakon metaphor,but I think that Plato uses it to refer to both major
forms ofexpression: speaking and writing. Both ofthese modes ofcommunication,as we

shall see later, are,indeed,strong medicines with vast power to cure or kill the patient
depending on how they are administered. Ifpersuasion is combined with truth, or reality,
in the drug ofrhetoric, it can lead a person toward self-knowledge. Ifpopular opinion

replaces truth as the second ingredient,the drug turns dangerous,and any self-knowledge
can be suppressed, resulting in the virtual loss ofthe higher self.

Metaphorically and mythically,Plato uses the north wind to symbolize popular
opinion. Popular opinion,like the wind,can often be an endless, meaningless drone that is

just as compelling as the wind which gives an actual physical push to everything in its
path. This push can range all the way fi-om gentle to overpowering,devastating,and vastly
destructive. In Plato's opinion, both Sophistic rhetoric, as well as unreflective writing,can
at times have the same dangerous effect on the mind that wind sometimes has on physical
objects. Things are not so different in our own modem culture. We are encouraged
through mass marketing to value money and what money buys above everything. We are
lured by easy credit to spend more than we make,living our lives in debt. Ifwe believe
modem popular opinion,then money does buy happiness. If, on the other hand,we are

armed with the Platonic toolsfor critical thinking, we can easily detect flaws in the
popular opinions disseminated by the mass media. Plato's first myth ofthePhaedrus,still
relevant today,is cmcial to his developing dialogue.

Thus we see that by intermpting his metonymic flow with a myth,Plato has moved
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his two principal players into an interesting position early in the text. Phaedrus has shown

his shallowness as well as his willingness to be guided(by his reaction to the myth),and
Socrates is now in position to take full advantage ofthese characteristics to attempt to
lead Phaedrus toward higher ground. The great teacher/physician will administer Phaedrus'

medicine with a sugar coating ofmyth,metaphor,formal speeches and prayers,that it will
be more readily swallowed by the patient.

The next bit ofaction in the story's metonymicflow has Phaedrus reading Lysias'
speech to Socrates. It is, as we expected,light,tempting and trivial, and Phaedrus is

ecstatic with praise for it. Socrates'serious work now begins when he sees how deeply
Phaedrus is entangled by Lysias'rhetoric. The interval ofdialogue between Lysias'speech
and Socrates'competing speech is very interesting and enlightening. Plato demonstrates
his genius by having Socrates rescue Phaedrus when it is almost too late. Phaedrus is

nearly overcome by the enemy. Thejob is huge,but Plato prepares Socrates with a

veritable arsenal ofrhetorical weapons.The main one he uses at this point is irony.Irony,
one ofthe four "master tropes" in Kenneth Burke's opinion(the other three being
metaphor, metonymy,and synecdoche){On SymbolsandSociety 247)is a powerful
device for the rhetorician and is especially useful for the dialectician. It works in a manner

similar to metaphor by stopping the flow ofthe metonymic contiguity.
Irony has its roots in dissimulation. M.H. Abrams,in^ Glossary ofLiterary
Terms,tells ofa stock character in Greek comedy called the eiron who pretended to be
less intelligent than he really was in order to triumph over a rival. "In most ofthe modem

critical uses ofthe term'irony,'" he says,"there remainsthe root sense ofdissembling or
hiding what is actually the case; not,however,in order to deceive,but to achieve special
rhetorical or artistic effects"(97). Socrates'use ofirony seems to me to accomplish both
goals. Sometimes he seems to deliberately deceive Phaedms by pretending to be naive or
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simple,and sometimes he is after a special rhetorical effect. William Van O'Connor,in his
entry on "irony" in The Princeton Encyclopedia ofPoetry andPoetics says that"Irony
functions as an agent ofqualification and refinement,"(408)and we certainly see Socrates
always aiming for that end in this dialectic. It is helpful,I find,to look at Socrates'use of

irony in the light ofGrice's Cooperative Principle(thesis 18).
After Phaedrus reads Lysias'speech to Socrates, he asks for an opinion."What do
you think ofthe discourse, Socrates? Is it not wonderful,especially in the diction?"

Socrates answers,"More than that,it is miraculous, my fnend,I am quite overcome by it"
(117). While seeming to agree with Phaedrus, Socrates has violated several maxims in the

Cooperative Principle. Socrates'answer is carefully ambiguous,thus flouting the maxim of

manner which says to avoid ambiguity. He also uses hyperbole when he calls the speech
miraculous,thereby exploiting the truth maxim. The combination ofhyperbole(violation
oftruth)and ambiguity(violation ofstraightforward manner)give an ironic flavor to
Socrates' words.

Phaedrus then recognizes Socrates'irony, becomes serious, and asks Socrates not

tojest, but to give a straight answer about Lysias'speech. Using conversational
implicature, Socrates dodges once again. He admits that he is not as thrilled with the

speech as Phaedrus but blames this on his own stupidity. This is a flagrant violation ofthe

truth maxim ofthe Cooperative Principle because Socrates is stating something which he
believes obviously to be false. Regardless ofhow much humility Socrates has, he can not
truthfully call himselfstupid. Socrates'use ofirony follows the classic sense ofAbrams'

eiron,the Greek comedic figure pretending to be less intelligent than he really is in order
to gain his own ends.

However,irony slows the pace ofthe metonymic textjust as metaphor does and

for the same reasons. The listener, realizing that a maxim ofthe Cooperative Principle has
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been violated, must search for and discover the implied meaning before going forward.
Usually this process is done on an unconscious level and concludes rapidly and
successfully thanks to Chen's "shared knowledge," but there is an unavoidable break in the
contiguity whenever the message is not literal and has to be translated.

After much banter in which Socrates attempts to get Phaedrus to see some ofthe

glaring weaknesses in Lysias'speech,Socrates gives up the direct line ofapproach and re
ignites Phaedrus'interest by saying that he feels a competing speech coming on.
Then Socrates demurs,teasing Phaedrus by making him think that he is afraid to

compete with Lysias'speech.Phaedrusis whipped into a fine frenzy by Socrates'bantering
threat to withhold his speech,so Socrates relentsfinally,having gained two advantages.
First,by telling Phaedrus what it is he feels afraid or unworthyto do,he has spelled out
precisely what he intends to do."Do you really suppose I am going to try to surpass the
rhetoric ofLysias and make a speech more ingenious than his?"(118),asks Socrates,
making sure thatPhaedrusis aware ofhis explicit intentions. Second,by tantalizing
Phaedrus and figuratively holding the speechjust out ofreach, Socrates has increased
Phaedrus desire while riveting his attention on the upcoming speech.
These rhetorical strategies and the ensuing dialogue between the two men also

serve to strengthen the realistic story line and hence,the text's metonymic framework.

Finally, we gain a better picture ofthe two men's characters and positions relative to each
other. We can see more clearly what their personal relationship is like.

Eventually,Socrates relents,and Phaedrus is again ecstatic to find that he is going

to hear another speech. Here,after a relatively long metonymicinterlude,Plato interrupts
his realistic storyline again,first with a prayer to the Muses and then with the speech.
The prayers in this text function,I believe, as rhetorical tours de force that

Socrates uses to impressPhaedrus. Theyfunction in the same general way as metaphor
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and myth,by cutting across the contiguous fabric ofmetonymy and disrupting the flow of

the work. Also,as with metaphor and myth,their message may be accepted as meaningful
by Phaedrus or ignored,because it is seemingly directed only to the deity. Socrates uses
this ambiguity ofpurpose as he does that ofmetaphor and myth to further his dialectical
teaching by allowing Phaedrus to be thejudge ofhis own readiness to receive instruction.
It is obviousthat Socrates is a deeply spiritual man. Therefore,prayer,or contact

with the gods,would be a natural means ofexpression for him.However,in admitting
this,it is not necessary to naively overlook the psychological influence ofSocrates'prayers
on Phaedrus. Whenever somebody suggests that a prayer should be said outside ofa

formal religious setting, different emotions may be felt by the listeners. First,they may feel
both intimidated and impressed because someone who expresses a wish to pray seemsto
be good friends with the deities. This person must be quite important to have such

important fiiends,and ifthe deities are willing to help him in some way,such asinspiring
him with a speech,the speech should be very fine,indeed. Second,ifthe prayer contains
some personal reference to the listeners, whether a plea for their welfare or even for their

improvement,their interest will certainly be snagged,just as it would be ifthey had

overheard two people talking about them. And third,they mayfeel cowed and slightly
guilty,as though they should have thought ofpraying too,but didn't. These feelings may
be fleeting,and soon overcome by common sense,but initially they do prick the listener.
Also,it is wellto keep in mind that although a prayer is addressed to a deity,a
spoken prayer is also the expression ofa personal opinion or plea by the orator. It is a

chanceforthe speaker to lay before not only the deity,but the hushed listeners as well,an
uncontested line ofreasoning. One person can't really quibble with another's prayers,

because one is ostensibly in the role ofobserver ofa transaction between two others,the
suppliant and the deity. Therefore,the praying individual gains a psychological advantage
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over all but the most stubbornly independent oflisteners.

Phaedrus is easily manipulated by many strategies, and this one,too,has its desired

effect. In the prayer to the Muses before his first speech,Socrates asksfor "aid in the tale
this most excellent man compels meto relate,that hisfnend whom he has hitherto

considered wise,may seem to him wiser still"(118). The prayer is,ofcourse,simply
dripping with Socrates'famousirony,but it hasthe effect oflulling Phaedrus into a false
sense oftrust. One ofSocrates'dialectic strategies seems to be to keep Phaedrus off
balance. First he praises Lysias'speech effusively,then he criticizes it harshly,and now he
is seemingly smoothing things over again through his use ofirony.
Socrates'prayer to the Musesis a classic strategy harking back to the metaphoric
period,according to Wheelwright."The epic poet's invocation ofthe Muse would

represent,in one aspect,the poet's desire to free himselffrom the'personal-infantile'type
ofthinking through being borne along by the more deeply expressive power ofarchetypal
thought patterns (540).It's notfor nothing that the Muses are the daughters ofLovelyhaired Mnemosyne,the goddess ofmemory.Later,in discussing the Myth ofTheuth,we
will see even more clearly the supreme value that Socrates places on the deep and creative
wellsprings ofmemory hidden in each ofus.

Socrates'invocation ofthe Muses,however,is a double-edged sword. Hesiod tells

us in the Theogony about the Muses who once taught him "beautiful song as he was
pasturing his flock in the foothills ofholy Mount Helicon." They appeared to him and told
him,"We know how to tell numerous lies which seem to be truthful,but whenever we

wish we know how to utter the Mltruth"(24). Although the Muses were companions of
Apollo,the god oftruth,they were capable also of backsliding. And,in fact,the Muses

themselves,with their good and bad powers,can serve as another metaphor illustrating the
same dichotomy in oral and written rhetoric that we find revealed in the dominant
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metaphor ofthis text,the pharmakon metaphor.In the various manifestations ofthis

metaphor,we come to see oral and written rhetoric as powerful drugs which can either

poison or cure.In the same way,the Muses are powerful creative forces,here called upon
to represent speaking and writing,which exhibit the same ambiguity ofpurpose. They can
pollute minds with false things made to seem true or elevate souls with truth.

Socrates summonsthe Musesand proceeds to entertain Phaedrus with a lively,
attractive speech full ofhalf-truths and unexamined assertions, much like Lysias'speech
only better crafted. In both cases,the orators were showing oflF, dazzling the audience
with quickness and wit,whipping up a sweet,addictive confection with no substance.

These two speeches illustrate the dangerous side ofthe Muses contribution to life,
illustrate the poisoned drug rather than the miracle cure.

Socrates speech is yet another heavy,interruptive weight on the rather spindly
metonymicframework ofPlato's text. Jane Curran in"The Rhetorical Techniques of
PlatosPhaedrus,says that his "...first speech pursues the same line as Lysias'did,but
argues in an organized and more logical way"(68). Why would Plato include such a

speech in this work? What value does aflawed speech by the master have inforwarding
the progress ofSocrates'dialectic? I believe there is a compelling reason which makes it

worth the risk to Plato ofpossibly overloading the metonymicframework and fragmenting
the whole text with another extended interruption.

Socrates has made a clever speech more or less imitating Lysias',and from now

on,he can freely criticize Lysias'ideas under the guise ofcriticizing his own work,thereby
avoiding the danger ofoffending or alienating Phaedrus by directly attacking his hero,
Lysias.Ifwe look at Socrates'situation after delivering his first speech and see how wellarmed he is now to take aim at and demolish Lysias'poor speech,we cannot but wonder if

Socrates'second-rate speech was part ofhis dialectic plan. By criticizing his own first
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speech,Socrates can freely and harshly criticize Lysias'speech because the two speeches
express the same overall opinion that non-lovers are preferable to lovers. In fact, Socrates
has already obliquely criticized Lysias'speech by making much out ofthe fact that his own

first speech is more carefully organized and the major terms are defined before being used.
Phaedrus,as usual,is ecstatic over the speech,but Socrates has a twinge ofconscience.
HeIS uncomfortable with his trivial speech's powerful effect on Phaedrus,and proposes
consequently to undo the damage with yet another speech,this one to be a palinode to
satisfy both the god oflove and Socrates'conscience.

The metonymic interlude between Socrates'two speechesforms a bridge of
commentary connecting them. Frye says

Continuous prose[is]the main instrument ofthought in the metonymic
period. In continuous prose,ifA and B seem to be inconsistent,one
can always insert intermediary verbal formulas,or rephrase them in a

commentary,in a way that will "reconcile" them...Commentary thus
becomes one ofthe leading metonymic genres,and the traditional

metaphorical images are used as illustrations ofa conceptual
argument.(10)

Plato has Socrates make extensive use ofcommentary in order to coax Phaedrus
to take one unsteady step at a time toward truth. Asfor metaphoricalimages,we are

positively awash in them throughout thePhaedrus-all, as Frye says,copiously

illustrating Socrates'conceptual argument. So,although Plato preachesindividuality and
introspection reinforced by his use ofmetonymy,as a man situated historically with one
foot in each camp,he still relies heavily on metaphorical devices to drive home his points
ofargument.

Plato also uses the interval between Socrates'two speeches to develop an air of
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spontaneity about Socrates'actions. First, he delivers a speech which,by his own
admission,is "dreadful...foolish, and somewhat impious"(121). Then,as he is about to

leave Phaedrus and return to the city, he feels compelled to recant and offer a palinode.

However,asI have said,I am skeptical ofSocrates'purported innocence and spontaneity.
Poor gullible Phaedrus has been backed gently into a comer and made to understand

(albeit for his own good)that dreadful and foolish as Socrates'first speech was,it was still
better than Lysias'speech.

Socrates leads into his second speech with another sugar-coated pill in the form of

a metaphoric tale about Stesichoms,a man struck blind by the gods for speaking untmths
about Helen. Hence,Socrates is slowly building up a case whereby careful attention to
leaming and speaking the tmth results in seeing, while deviating from the tmth results in
blindness. The only way to reach the truth, accordingly,is through relentless reflection and

self-examination. The uncritical mind is likely to accept the much more palatable,though
less nourishing,substitute ofpublic opinion,often spread through the populace by shallow
but glamorous sophistic speeches. Stesichoms regains his sight by recanting and offering a
palinode to the god oflove. Socrates,too,recants his previously stated views about love
and therefore retains his clear-sightedness literally and metaphorically.

In Socrates'second speech,Plato expresses the heart ofhis philosophy concerning
absolute tmth. Here we encounter a comparison ofthe soul to a charioteer trying to
control two horses,one good and one bad. The soul yeams to drive in the upper regions
oftmth along with the gods,but the unmly black horse constantly pulls in a downward
direction. Naturally,this makes driving difficult, so that the charioteer encounters all

manner oftrouble. The charioteer strives to drive higher in order to catch sight oftmth,or

reality; but,says Socrates,"...after much toil they all go away without gaining a view of
reality, and when they have gone away they feed upon opinion"(124). Opinion makes but

36

a poor meal for the charioteer who started out hungering for truth, or reality. Here again,
as in preceding myths,we see the opposition that Plato sets up between his definition of

truth and opinion. This dichotomy between truth and opinion,I maintain,is the primary
difference between the psychological darkness ofthe metaphoric period when people did
not see themselves as discrete individuals and the newly risen sun ofindividuality which
appears in the metonymic era. Plato, while lavish in his use ofmetaphors to shed light on
difficult subjects,is careful to keep his work,thePhaedrus,solidly grounded in
metonymical realism.

At this point, we have heard three speeches,one written by Lysias and two

delivered extemporaneously by Socrates. Obviously,Socrates appreciates the oration as a
potential teaching tool ifhe uses two ofthem in his dialectical encounter with Phaedrus.

One effect he may have gained from his speeches is to spell out the difference between

logos and emotion. Lysias'speech was written and delivered possibly to seduce Phaedrus

and other attractive young men who heard it. It pretends to evolve into a call to logos,
but,as Socrates repeatedly points out,it is not built on a foundation oftruth as logos must
be. Lysias seems to desire to have Phaedrus,for one,as a lover,and he plots to win him
regardless ofwhether it is in the best interests ofPhaedrus,or even Lysias himselfthat this

should come about. Lysias is governed definitely by his black horse while writing his
speech. Marline Anderson,in her thesis,A Deconstructive Analysis ofPlato'sPhaedrus.

agrees when she defines sophistic rhetoric as "persuasion without conscience"(20).
Socrates then gives two speeches,the first demolishes Lysias'credibility and serves
as a warning about the dangers ofrhetoric founded on half-truths and the second shows

Phaedrus that the persuasive powers ofrhetoric can be put to a noble use when close
reasoning takes the place ofsweeping statements.

Socrates'second speech ends with another prayer,this one addressed to the god of
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love. In it, he lashes out at Lysias as being the immediate cause of this troublesome

confusion between truth and opinion because he was the father ofthe first speech which
was basely persuasive without being grounded in truth. Socrates prays that Lysias will see

the light and turn from sophistic rhetoric to dialectic and philosophy. He ends with a plea
that through Lysias'conversion,"Phaedrus may no longer hesitate, as he does now,
between two ways,but may direct his life with all singleness ofpurpose toward love and

philosophical discourses"(129). This prayer, clearly meant to function as a piece of
persuasive rhetoric directed at Phaedrus, has its intended effect.

Phaedrus ingenuouslyjoins Socrates in his prayer, signaling a major change in his
readiness for instruction. He reveals that all through Socrates'second speech,he has

worried that Lysias could not possibly do as well ifhe were to give a competing speech.

Phaedrus'idol has been shown to have feet ofclay by Socrates'clever ploy offirst giving a
speech comparable in many ways with Lysias',then showing the glaring weaknesses of

both speeches by harshly criticizing his own,and finally, giving a second,far superior,
philosophically grounded speech.

The second prayer turns out to be icing on the cake,and Phaedrus'enthusiastic

response shows Socrates that the path has been cleared for further advances through
dialectic. The patient has responded well to the various types ofrhetorical drugs which
have been used on him,and he is beginning to recover some memory ofwhat is real.

However,as any good physician knows,one can't hurry a patient's recovery overly fast
without risking a recurrence ofthe illness.

Plato's metaphors,exemplified by the central one in the second speech comparing
the soul to a charioteer, are so vivid and extended that it is hard to telljust where the river
ofmetaphor flows into the sea ofmyth. But, myth or metaphor,we have many
interruptions to the metonymic continuity ofthe text. However,it is becoming more and
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more obvious that Plato,the great rhetorical strategist, has carefully calculated the effect
ofeach metaphorical interruption and is still in complete control ofthe total work.

Section Two

Phaedrus,judging by his response to Socrates'prayer to Eros after his second speech,now

seems to be genuinely interested in learning the means ofjudging the quality ofspeaking
and writing. He is developing some critical-thinking skills through Socrates'judicious
application ofthe pharmakon. He is well on his way to being saved and converted.
Phaedrus,by now,is worried about the basic value ofdiscourse. Do oral and

written rhetoric have any redeeming qualities at all? Socrates admits that they do,but
carefully points out to Phaedrus the negative as well as positive potential,the pharmakon

effect, ofthese two forms ofdiscourse."Then that is clear to all,that writing speeches is
not in itselfa disgrace...But the disgrace,Ifancy,consists in speaking or writing not well,
but disgracefully and badly"(130). Socrates goes on to defend writing and speaking but
makes a careful distinction between the Muses'two talents: to persuade basely by means
offalsehood or to persuade nobly through truth.

In this lengthy section ofdialogue,Plato is playing out the metonymic,realistic
plot line to show us how a good dialectic advances,butjust as Phaedrus asks a critical

question about how tojudge the quality ofwriting, we are again plunged headlong into a
myth interjected by Socrates. Obviously,the patient is not yet altogether ready for the

strong medicine ofdirect discourse. Frye observes that "After the rise of metonymic
language,stories are frequently used as concrete illustrations ofabstract arguments,in

other words as allegories. This is close to the role that myths have in Plato"(33). True
enough. Again at this point,Plato chooses to dramatize his argument with a myth. He has
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found this to be a good strategy to hold Phaedrus'interest, and it seems to bejust the sort
ofeffective strategy one would expect to see used in a metonymic text written at a point in
history when the metaphoric period had just drawn to a close.

The central metaphor in the myth ofthe locusts advances us a step farther than the
metaphor ofthe undiflferentiated wind with its monotonous, meaningless noise and

physical impetus which we saw in the myth ofBoreas. This time we see a species of

creatures who,though separate individuals, nevertheless speak and act as one. Their song
is really no song at all, but another form of monotonous drone—communal,this time,but

still meaningless. Yet,the locusts are so entranced by their own singing that they forget
everything else in the ecstasy ofchanting their communal song.

This,I think,can be another metaphor illustrating the unreflective acceptance of
popular opinion as truth. Both the locusts in the second myth and the wind in the

Phaedrus'first myth seem to be emphasizing the potential danger ofrhetoric in the form
ofspeech-making. In both cases, meaningless noises cause grave harm. These noises

function as metaphors for oral transmission ofsomething inferior to truth-popular
opinion. Further on,we will see that the myth ofTheuth gives a parallel warning about
silent, or written, dissemination ofhalf-truths. In each case,Phaedrus can understand the

deeper meaning ofthe myth ifhe is able, or enjoy it as a story ifhe has not yet developed
the necessary critical-thinking skills to interpret it on a deeper level.
In the myth ofBoreas, Oreithjna is raped by the meaningless noise(Typhon)and

robbed ofher sense ofautonomous self. In the myth ofthe locusts,these creatures forget
everything in the ecstasy ofthe communal chant, symbolizing both their uncritical

embracing ofpopular opinion and their forgetfulness oftruth, which result in physical

death. In Socrates'second speech we learned that forgetting truth has dire consequences
for the immortal soul, also. The soul will have different kinds of human incarnation,some
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good and some bad,depending on how strong a memory it retains ofits glimpses oftruth

or reality. The souls governed mostly by the good horse will be reborn at the high end of

the spectrum as philosophers, while the souls whose bad horse pulled them down will give
up looking for truth, settle for opinion,and be reborn as mere poets.

Since this is Plato's text, it comes as no surprise that philosophers are the only
beings who remember enough to stay "...in communion through memory with those things
the communion with which causes God to be divine"(125). Philosophers are lovers of
wisdom who yearn for and strive to remember the beauty ofabsolute truth while at the
same time realizing that the goal will never be reached. Only God can be in communion

with truth. For humans,the quest becomes the shimmering,ephemeral goal,and the bits of
recovered memory,strenuously and painfully produced through rigorous self-examination,
reflect the dazzling,tantalizing beauty that encourages advancement to higher levels of
understanding. They are the sparkling gifts from Mnemosyne to the seeker oftruth,the
philosopher.

As Frye describes it, the metaphoric era ofhistory emphasized community.People

felt that unity was ofthe highest importance,and independent thinking was simply unheard
of. As the metonymic era dawned and the alphabet was invented,things began to change.
The development ofthe written word enabled people to form the perception ofprivate

thought,and individuation began to appear in the human species. Ivan Illich and Barry
Sanders,in ABC The Alphabetization ofthe Popular Mind,maintain that "The selfis as

much an alphabetic construct as word and memory,thought and history,lie and narration"

(71). The written alphabet,then,is the cornerstone supporting Plato's idea ofthe
independent pursuit ofself-knowledge. Yet,the sophists were ready to use this new tool,
writing, as well as the dependable old rhetorical methods ofpubUc speaking to persuade

human beings to turn back toward the era ofundifferentiation,ofcommunal thought,to
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turn back toward popular opinion as a measure ofright and wrong. They saw no benefit

commensurate with the struggle in the effort to reach truth,so they were willing to settle
for probability as voiced by opinion.

Ifone listens to the siren song ofthe mob and fails to think critically about what
the mob says,then the feathered soul falls downward from the heights oftruth into a

lower level ofindividual consciousness or differentiation,into the realm ofpopular
opinion. Plato's myth ofthe locusts shows us what happens ifwe move backwards toward

a mass-minded merging with any group advocating whatever popular opinion.
The search for truth is largely a lonely, solitary pursuit where the seeker becomes
alienated from friends, relatives and countrymen who have chosen to be content with

probability. Much later in human history, St. Augustine explores this concept in a
wonderfully insightful passage in his Confessions.
But why is it that "truth gives birth to hatred"? It is because truth is loved

in such a way that those who love something else would like to believe that

what they love is the truth, and because they would not like to be deceived,
they object to being shown that in fact they are deceived. And so they hate
truth for the sake ofwhatever it is they love instead oftruth. They love the
light oftruth, but hate it when it shows them up as wrong.(233)
One reason why Phaedrus must be led to the truth so slowly is because Socrates

can't afford to humiliate or embarrass Phaedrus by revealing that he is deceived and

thereby making him look foolish. A clumsy haste on the part ofSocrates might "give birth
to hatred" in Phaedrus,thereby closing his mind to further investigation. In order to
accomplish his delicate work, Socrates needs every rhetorical device that Plato can

furnish. Phaedrus has to be delicately turned right around in his thinking before he can
appreciate Socrates'search for truth and self-knowledge.
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Embracing unexamined popular opinion,on the other hand, means that there is no

need for the difficultjob of reflection and meditation. One can simply accept what others

believe, put all doubts about those beliefs out ofone's mind,and avoid the struggle toward
truth. This is the lure ofLysias,the lure ofthe easy path, which Socrates was willing to
fight with every rhetorical drug at his disposal in order to inoculate his patient against halftruths and falsehoods.

The lessons ofthe dialectic are accumulating, mostly in the form ofattractive

examples ofmyth,metaphor,speech and prayer,and Phaedrus,the shallow youth is well
on his way to a complete "conversion," as Fish would say:
For the end ofa dialectical experience is(or should be)nothing less than a
conversion, not only a changing,but an exchanging ofminds. It is

necessarily a painful process(like sloughing offa second skin)in the course

ofwhich both parties forfeit a great deal; on the one side the applause ofa
pleased audience,and on the other,the satisfaction oflistening to the
public affirmation ofour values and prejudices.(2)

Phaedrus now begins to see the value oflooking beyond the easy,glitzy surface ofLysias'
speech and questioning the facile,lazily-reasoned arguments ofthe sophist. At last, he
seems ready for some straight metonymical discussion about speaking and writing.

After the locust myth, Socrates and Phaedrus agree to "discuss the theory ofgood
(or bad)speaking and wnting"(131). Socrates begins with what he thinks is a sound

premise: that in order to produce a good speech,the mind ofthe speaker must know the

truth about the matters he will speak of. But Phaedrus immediately objects on the grounds
that he has heard it said that "persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the

truth"(131). Here we are again face to face with the poison pill,the misleading side ofthe
Muses,and it is clear to Socrates that his patient is far from cured.
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Then,in several pages oflively dialogue, Socrates demonstrates the usefulness of

dialectic as a teaching tool. This section ofdialogue brings us back to the metonymic
structure ofthe overall work and gives it some needed reinforcement. The reader awakens

from the magic spell ofmyth and metaphor,once again becoming aware ofa realistic
scene where Socrates and Phaedrus sit talking beside a brook under a plane tree on a hot

afternoon. Even this section ofthePhaedrus contains some metaphors,but they are brief
and don't interrupt the metonymic flow.

Socrates,in this section, continues his lyrical approach to dialectic by
anthropomorphizing rhetoric, as well as the arguments he uses to persuade Phaedrus that
knowledge oftruth is an essential ingredient in responsible rhetoric and writing. Indeed,he
almost deifies them. Socrates pretends to quote lady rhetoric and summons his own

arguments with a formal prayer that the "noble creatures[will] persuade the fair young
Phaedrus that unless he pay proper attention to philosophy he will never be able to speak
properly about anything"(132).

The personification ofrhetoric and argument is very interesting when viewed in the
light ofHavelock's discussion ofmetaphor and how it was used in the Homeric era. "The
psychology oforal memorisation and oral record required the content ofwhat is to be

memorized to be a set ofdoings. This in turn presupposes actors or agents"(171). In
other words,personification was the only way to deal with abstract concepts in a pre
literate society, and thus,abstractions had to be treated metaphorically. The most common
way ofdoing this was to make the abstract concept an attribute ofone or another ofthe

gods. The god then acted out the concept in stories or myths. So each god in the pantheon
becomes a vehicle carrying certain groups ofrelated abstract concepts. Havelock describes

this as "a basic principle underlying the metaphors ofthe saga"(168). Accordingly,
"Phenomena other than persons can be described,but only as they are imagined to be
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behaving as persons would. The environment becomes a great society and the phenomena
are represented as members ofthis society who interact upon each other as they play their
assigned roles"(168).

Therefore, when Plato has Socrates personify rhetoric and argument, he is

reaching back in time in order to utilize an ancient technique that was integral to the
metaphoric era. This makes the arguments more vivid to Phaedrus, but his use ofthis
peculiar technique also emphasizes the placement ofSocrates'and Plato's historical

position on the cusp ofthe two eras, metaphoric and metonymic. The tone ofSocrates'
prayer to his arguments is still light and playfiil despite its serious under-currents, and
Phaedrus is thereby entertained as well as instructed.

Finally, Socrates leads the dialectic to the point where he can state that "he who

knows not the truth, but pursues opinions, will, it seems,attain an art ofspeech which is

ridiculous, and not an art at aU"(133).Phaedrus indicates mild agreement~"Probably"—
and Socrates decides that at last it is safe to dismember Lysias'speech without alienating,
and therefore losing,Phaedrus. This he does with the consummate skill ofa surgeon
amputating first this piece ofthe speech,then that one,examining them all, and finding
each one to be infected, contaminated,gangrenous. Interestingly enough, Socrates,the
good physician, at this point uses two variations ofthe pharmakon metaphor. First, he
demonstrates how the dangers oftrusting an inept and improperly trained physician are
comparable to trusting an orator who lazily and sloppily uses opinion rather than truth to

support his arguments. Second,he compares the methods used in the arts ofhealing and
rhetoric.

As the dialogue progresses, Socrates solidifies his position as to the importance of
speaking and writing on a foundation oftruth gained through diligent personal reflection
and participation in dialectic by stating the opposite view and vanquishing it. Some ofthe
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sophists(notably Tisias)taught apparently that probability was both as good a foundation
for the art ofspeaking as truth and much easier to come by. Socrates demonstrates to

Phaedrus'satisfaction that even Tisias would admit that probability isjust another name
for "that which most people think"(139),or popular opinion.
A person willing to settle for probability will not have to examine anything as

rigorously as a truth-seeker. And when it comes to looking inward,knowing thyself, the
former can unconsciously choose the most palatable probabilities concerning their own

character and conduct and thereby avoid the painfully deep probing and exhaustively
courageous,unblinking honesty required for self-examination by the truth-seeker. People

who make a habit ofaccepting probability instead ofsearching for the truth become lazy
and dangerous. They urge others also to take the easy road,and they become as seductive
as a dangerous drug;their ways are habit-forming. Although truth-seekers will never find
truth, they will, Socrates claims,come much closer to some ultimate ideal than those who

deliberately turn away from the struggle.
In both oral and written rhetoric, we can see the vast potential to advocate

positions and persuade others to follow. The Muses have an awesome power to deceive,
or to reveal truth, and that power is embodied in both speaking and writing. When we
remember Nietzsche's point that people are so easily deceived because they wish to be,we

can see why Plato was worried about the potential power ofrhetoric to pollute peoples'
souls. Griswold elegantly explains what Plato understood two millennia earlier,that "The
problems ofself-knowledge and self-deception lie at the heart ofthe problem ofrhetoric"

(173). Phaedrus perfectly represents'Everyperson'being pulled in two directions at the

same time. There is the glamorous seduction ofthe easy, popular path advocated by

Lysias,and opposed to that is the more difficult but ultimately more rewarding path urged
by Socrates. Socrates and Lysias exemplify the two-faced power ofthe muses,the
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cure/poison potential ofthe pharmakon. And it seems to me that Plato makes Socrates

work so hard restating the same lesson over and over again in a different form because he
recognizes the power ofLysias and those like him to undo everything Socrates has

accomplished. Socrates'dialectic is rather like a vaccination which must be given,the
results interpreted,then possibly given again and yet again and again until finally it takes.
And even then, we cannot underestimate the power ofpopular opinion.
Meanwhile,back in the metonymical framework ofPlato's text,the corpses of
rhetorical techniques used by Lysias and Tisias to promote probability over truth now
litter the battleground, notjust cut down,but with stakes driven through their hearts to
prevent any later resurrection in Phaedrus'mind. Finally, Socrates surveys the carnage and
declares that enough has been said about the proper and improper uses ofthe art of
speaking. Now it is time to move on and discuss writing in the same way,and with the

introduction ofthe new subject, Socrates relates the final myth ofthePhaedrus,the myth
ofTheuth.

Socrates has utilized Phaedrus'taste for myths several times before, the myth of
Boreas,the myth ofthe soul and the myth ofthe cicadas, and here, he breaks the

metonymical continuity to present Phaedrus with one last sugar-coated pill to introduce a

dialectical discussion ofthe art ofwriting. Maybe these pills are appetite-enhancers to
make Phaedrus hungry for the more serious and difficult work of searching for truth with
Socrates.

Section Three

The final myth ofthe Phaedrus,the myth ofTheuth,calls on the pharmakon

metaphor once again. Theuth,a minor Egyptian god,inventor ofmany things,brings them
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to the god-king Thamus. Thamus praises and criticizes everything according to its merits.
When Theuth presents his invention ofletters. He proudly announces that he has

discovered an elixir ofmemory and wisdom.In the translation used by Illich and Sanders,

Thamus complains,"This facility will make souls forgetful because they will no longer
school themselves to meditate. They will rely on letters. Things will be recollected from
outside by means ofalien symbols;they will not remember on their own. What you are
offering me is a drug for recollection, not for memory..."(25).

I chose this translation because ofthe words "school themselves to meditate." My
usual translation renders this phrase as "practice their memory"(140). The "meditation"
translation better clarifies for me the distinction that Plato is trying to make between

recollection, and memory derived through serious introspection~the kind that gives us
inner direction, awakening the conscience and rendering us less susceptible to the wind of
popular opinion. Memory,the goddess Mnemosyne,mother ofthe Muses,offers to us a
sacred river ofremembrance which is our only conduit to the universal truths which our

souls have glimpsed in the past, and this river must be reached through meditation, a
rather arduous and disciplined mode ofintrospection, which is very close to Socrates'kind
ofinquiry and very far from simple recollection.

Throughout the Phaedrus, Socrates is constantly demurring about his own
speeches and ideas. They belong to the local deities who inspired him,or he remembers

hearing them but forgets where. C. J. Rowe calls this a "transparent ploy"(9),but I find it
perfectly compatible with Socrates'notion ofmemory. Any philosophical verities that

finally come to usthrough meditation are gifts from the wellspring ofMnemosyne,and
these very gifts are the raw material which Plato has Socrates painstakingly elicit from
Phaedrus. The verities are then examined and discussed to produce a successful dialectic.
Meditation is a difficult and demanding exercise, and ifwe can instead read books
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which purport to have all the answers we need,those books will become for most ofus a

seductive drug. We must now look back at Plato's distinction between probability and

truth. "Only philosophical reflection," Rowe says Plato believes,"will enable us properly
to grasp the good,and realize our nature as moral beings. This fundamental idea,together
with the equally fiindamental model ofphilosophy as an unflagging search for the truth, he
[Plato]inherited from Socrates"(5).

Truth is hard,ifnot impossible,to reach,so why not settle for probability,or that
which is considered right by popular opinion? It is always easier in the short run;it is
usually seductive,just as the hallucinogenic drugs that alter the state ofreality. What harm

is there in taking the easy way out? Only irreparable harm to our immortal souls,says
Plato through Socrates. Griswold puts it succinctly when he says,"The written word lets
uspersuade ourselves too easily that we are in irrefutable possession ofthe truth, while in

fact we are not. It facilitates our tendency to become dogmatists or zealots rather than

philosophers"(207). Throughout history,the path ofthe person in "irrefiitable possession
ofthe truth" has been the fnghtening and vicious path ofthe fanatic. We have only to
think ofHitler in order to comprehend the danger.

Maybe the only way we can ever recognize that we are on the path toward truth,
not echoing popular opinion,is to realize that we have not yet found the truth and never

will. We can only keep searching. This attitude ofhumility, Socrates'attitude,is in direet
contradiction to the dogmatic attitude that Thamus worries will be fostered by the written
word when he tells Theuth, again in the Illich Sanders translation,"Your instruetion will

give them only a semblance oftruth, not truth itself. You will train ignorant know-alls,
nosy know-nothings,boring wiseacres"(26).

Plato's distinction between remembering and memory is discussed by Illich and

Sanders in a helpful chapter entitled,"Memory." Any discussion ofPlato's thoughts on
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memory must begin with Mnemosyne, mother ofthe Muses and goddess ofmemory,who

is older,even,than the Olympian gods. Illich and Sanders describe her "wellspring of
remembrance" this way:

In her clear waters float the remains ofpast lives,the memories that Lethe

has washed from the feet ofthe departed,turning dead men into mere

shadows. A mortal who has been blessed by the gods can approach
Mnemosyne and listen to the Muses sing in their several voices what is,
what was,and what will be(14).

Here,we have memory described as a wellspring, and later in the chapter, she is

described as a stream. These are moving,changing,elusive metaphors for memory,well
suited for a pre-literate culture because speech is also a moving,changing thing, as is
thinking in an oral culture. This concept is much closer to the mythos ofthe metaphoric
period than the logos ofthe metonymie era. Plato, while espousing logos, demonstrates
that mythos and memory as described here are valuable guideposts in the search for selfknowledge. He is headed in a fiuitfijl modern direction(logos)while still valuing part of
the old way(mythos). The problem oftruth versus popular opinion is highly complex and

Plato's mind far too subtle to enable him to come up with simplistic answers favoring only
the new at the expense ofthe old. He chooses to work with the best aspects ofboth eras,
examining the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each in order to clarify his pursuit of
truth. Anderson also looks with interest at Plato's combining ofboth mythos and logos.
"The subject ofthe Phaedrus" she avers,"emerges fi-om the clash ofthe mythos and the
logos of the text"(28).

But this concept ofmind and memory as a river in which the same thing never

floats by twice is so alien to a literate person as to be very nearly impossible to grasp. In
an effort to help us understand the pre-literate mind,Illich and Sanders say that prior to
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the invention ofthe alphabet,"Thinking itselftakes wing;inseparable from speech,it is
never there but always gone,like a bird in flight"(4).

The literate mind is much more comfortable with Aristotle's concept ofmemory as
a storehouse. Moving waters or a storehouse. These are two vastly different ways of
characterizing memory,and perhaps Plato's myth ofTheuth can help clarify the difference.

Thamus worries about the effect that the invention ofletters will have on human memory;
the effect he is worried about,I think, is the turning ofa fluid memory into a static
storehouse.

When memory is a river, it is open to all sorts ofpossibility and potential. It has the

unusual and rather mysterious power to produce surprises. Walter J. Ong,in Oralityand
Literacy, gives us a better understanding ofthe functioning ofmemory in the metaphoric
era when he says that

Persons whose world view has been formed by high literacy need to remind
themselves that in fimctionally oral cultures the past is not felt as an
itemized terrain, peppered with verifiable and disputed 'facts' or bits of
information. It is the domain ofthe ancestors, a resonant source for

renewing awareness ofpresent existence, which itselfis not an itemized
terrain either.(98)

This description almost mirrors the differences perceived by the modem mind to exist

between history and myth. Ifa person persists in questioning the historical veracity ofa
myth,she will miss the resonance that Ong speaks of. Maybe myths,when their function is
properly understood,can serve us by reactivating the river ofMnemosyne in our modem
minds.

A river is always mnning,so the same memory cannot be captured twice in

identical form. A storehouse,on the other hand,is a more static place. A person can
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retrieve the identical memory many times because she actively and deliberately stored it to
begin with. Ofcourse, we modem people still have the river ofthe unconscious which can

flood the carefully-catalogued storeroom ofmemoryfrom time to time producing a degree
ofmystery and surprise, but a storehouse memory stands much more under the control of

the owner than a river memory. Unfortunately,that control carries a high price because
most ofthe mystery connoted by the river concept is eradicated, and its broad potential is

circumscribed. Fiye says that"As the critics ofthe god Thoth,the inventor ofwriting,
remark in Plato'sPhaedrus,the ability to record has a lot more to do with forgetting than

with remembering: with keeping the past in the past,instead ofcontinuously recreating it
in the present"(22). Only through some form ofmeditation,of deliberately exposing
ourselves to the river through arduous concentration,can we modem literate humans

recapture what Plato saw as the tme function ofthe memory,to lead us toward that which
is real.

So Plato has plenty ofreason to make Socrates wary ofthe new invention of

wnting if, as Thamus says,it is capable ofweakening the resources ofmemory in the souls
ofthose who use it. However,Plato cannot despise writing. He obviously conceives it to
be a helpful tool as long as it is used in the right way. Ofcourse he himselfused it to write

his dialogues because he recognized its vast power.He may have been one ofthe many
who saw the good side ofwriting but one ofthe few voices crying in the wildemess to
wam ofthe potential for evil that the revolutionary new written alphabet also held, hence

his extensive use ofthe pharmakon metaphor. Havelock,in discussing the vast differences

between the oral and literate mind,the metaphoric and metonymic conceptual processes,
and between the pursuit ofopinion and the pursuit ofabstract tmth,says that "Plato was
aware also and rightly so that only his genius had been able fully to realise that this was a

revolution, and that it had to be pushed with urgency"(267).Plato was certainly waging a
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revolution against what he perceived as improper uses ofspeaking and writing,uses not
couched in truth. This is why Plato makes Socrates so ruthless in his battle for Phaedrus'

soul. Socrates uses extensively the powerfiil rhetorical arsenal at his disposal, especially
metaphors and myths.

By beginning the discussion about writing with a myth, Socrates has

introduced Phaedrus to his major arguments in a light,lyrical way,well-suited to the
young man.Phaedrus, although still unable to appreciate on his own the subtle wisdom of
Socrates' myths,is becoming in one way a more sophisticated listener and accuses

Socrates ofmaking up myths and stories to suit his points ofargument. Socrates tartly

reproves him for looking too critically at the source ofthe message rather thanjudging it
according to the truthfulness of its underlying wisdom. This is entirely consistent with the
message Socrates delivered in his discussion ofthe Phaedrus'first myth,the myth of
Boreas. It doesn't matter where the stories ofmyth came from or whether they are
historically true; what matters is what they can teach us about ourselves.

This consistency illustrates the beauty ofunity in the Phaedrus. Throughout the
text,Plato gives Socrates complete constancy ofpurpose. The metonymical contiguity is
broken with many techniques that temporarily halt textual progress,including metaphor,

myth,prayer,speech,and use ofironic devices. Each break, however,is strategically
necessary to advance the dialectic, even while seeming to block the flow ofthe text. The
pace and direction ofthe text is determined by the progress ofthe dialectic, and when we
see this, we are no longer troubled by the impromptu twists and turns in this work.

Phaedrus recognizes thejustice ofSocrates'reproofabout the myth and admits
that he was wrong.From there,they proceed to discuss the myth and its meaning. I think
it intriguing that after this small sign ofrestiveness from Phaedrus, his teasing ofSocrates
about the source ofthe myths, Socrates stops using myths for the rest ofthe text. In fact.
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the whole dialectic turns toward a conclusion at this point. Back in our metonymical story
line,Phaedrus begins to get restless. Maybe he is hot and tired. The only sign ofhis
discomfort is his light-hearted remark about Socrates' stories, but Socrates,the good
physician,is always watching the patient's reaction to each ofthe drugs'applications and
he knows when to quit using each different rhetorical pill as he observes its effectiveness
wane. The small remonstrance from Phaedrus gives Socrates the signal not to overdose
the patient.

Socrates rapidly ends the dialectic with one last simile and a final metaphor. The

simile compares writing to painting, noting that it seems lifelike but is not. Writing says
always only one thing and is incapable ofanswering questions about itselfexcept through
its mother/father. And since the author is almost never present with the reader,a work of
writing is essentially an orphan—as Derrida describes it—and is, therefore, much less
helpful than the living, breathing words ofa dialectic.
The metaphor,following so fast on the heels ofthe simile as to almost trip over it,
compares writing to gardening. Socrates convinces Phaedrus that a wise person "who has
knowledge ofthejust and the good and beautiful"(141)would not carelessly sow his

words in ink and expect instant results, but would painstakingly plant his words by means
ofdialectic so that they would bear the greatest fhiit in the long-run. The unexpected
proximity ofthese last two extended figures ofspeech gives us a feeling ofrushing toward
the finish line. Socrates does not want to lose Phaedrus'interest and goodwill as he draws

his dialectic to a close. At this point,Phaedrus conveniently asks for a synopsis ofthe
arguments about oral and written rhetoric.
Plato has Socrates drive home his key points one last time, now using literal

language that lends itselfto no alternate interpretations. Socrates' deft use ofthe
pharmakon offigurative language has done its work ofpersuasion, and the patient is now
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ready for straight talk. Phaedrus,at this point, agrees with everything Socrates says.
Socrates stresses the need to speak and write from the vantage-point oftruth,truth

discovered within oneselfthrough the process ofdialectic with the aid ofMnemosyne.
Also,one must realize, he says,that writing is never the way to achieve great certainty and
clearness. Rather,it is a somewhat playful mode,and not altogether serious. Therefore,
speaking and writing can be helpful ifproperly used. But,says Socrates, woe betide the

lazy person who speaks and writes on a foundation ofprobability alone or takes writing
too seriously."For whether one be awake or asleep,ignorance ofright and wrong and
good and bad is in truth inevitably a disgrace, even ifthe whole mob applaud it"(142).
Socrates,as always,says that knowledge ofright and wrong,good and bad is to

be found in one's own soul through meditation and reflection, and this knowledge can be
examined and reinforced through a dialectical process undertaken in company with other
seekers oftruth. But rarely do we get anywhere near to the truth by letting the "whole

mob" do our thinking for us,because popular opinion, Socrates has shown,by its very
definition, is nearly always the spokesman for probability instead oftruth.
Socrates follows his precis with messages for Phaedrus to deliver to Lysias about
the day's discussion, and the text ends with another prayer by Socrates,this one addressed
to "Pan and all ye other gods ofthis place"(143). This final prayer is the only one in the
Phaedrus that does not contain a petition for the gods to improve somebody else.
Socrates asks only that he, himselfwill be brought closer to eternal truth. This reverent,
humble prayer is certainly the most appealing and seemingly the most heartfelt one in the

entire text. Phaedrus begs to "share in this prayer;for friends have all things in common"
(143),and the final plank is hammered into the metonymic framework ofthis dialogue as
they take their leave together.
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Chapter Three: The View

We havejust witnessed not only a pristine example ofdialectic in action, but a
scene ofepic battle in which two powerful camps wage war for possession ofPhaedrus'
very soul.

We can see the reason for this gargantuan rift in rhetorical theory ifwe look at

Gorgias as a spokesman for the Sophists,comparing his views with Plato's. Romilly tells
us that Gorgias acknowledges the aptness ofcomparing rhetoric with both magic and

drugs in order to grasp the vast potential power ofrhetoric for good or evil. Beyond this,
however,Gorgias turns sharply in another direction absolutely antithetical to Plato.

"Gorgias," says Romilly,"had also admitted in the Helen that the very principle ofthe art

ofspeech was to stir passions, and thereby to deceive...He had established this power of
speech on the frailty and uncertainty ofhuman opinion. Now nothing was so averse to

Plato's passion for accurate knowledge than such an attitude"(25). Indeed,deceiving by
appealing to passions seems to be an ignominious end for rhetoric to aim at. This

discussion is reminiscent ofour earlier one on the separation ofthoughts and feelings. Ifa
person allows herselfto substitute feelings for rational thought, her behavior will become

erratic, unpredictable and dangerous. Thought,as Plato fijlly understood,is the only solid
foundation for prudent action.

Plato is suspicious ofboth oral and written rhetoric,linguistic tools which are

demonstrated to hold great power in the dawning metonymic era. Both are pharmakon,
both have amazing powers to cure or to poison. His delicate accomplishment in the

Phaedrus consists of having Socrates persuade the impressionable young man to become
aware ofthe full spectrum ofpotential power held by both speaking and writing,to teach
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him to recognize both the dark side and the enlightening side ofthese two modes of
communieation.

For these reasons, Soerates uses all the drugs in his rhetorical repertoire in order
to inoculate Phaedrus against the dangers ofseduction represented by Lysias and Tisias.
For these men know how to use writing and speech-making with the Muses first-stated

end in view,that ofmaking things appear true which are really false or only halftrue. They
know how to use the pharmakon to poison the soul and drag it backwards away from the
light oftruth and self-knowledge,into the darkness ofemotion-driven, unexamined
popular opinion.

How one feels about Plato's pursuit ofabsolute truth depends on one's individual

orientation to life. Although we don't all agree on the merits ofPlato's philosophy,there is
little argument with the view that he was a very able advocate for his ideas. His command

ofthe arts ofboth rhetorie and writing is awesome,and his use ofdevicesfound in these

disciplines is supremely masterful. Platonic ideas ofabstractions like truth and honor go
hand in hand,as we have seen, with Vico and Frye's description ofthe metonymic era,the
birth ofan individual self, and the concept ofpersonal responsibility. Frye says that in the

metonymic era, words are'put for'thoughts~"outward expressions ofan inward reality"
(8). The sophists'concept ofexpediency is not so closely allied with the metonymic idea of
a transcendent order as is Plato's concept ofabsolutes. In fact,Plato's concept of"truth"
or "reality," as explained in the Phaedrus, almost defines the idea oftranscendent order. If

we can sometimes catch a glimpse ofabsolute truth,the lessons we learn from it will give
us guidelines as to how best to live our lives in harmony with the transcendent order
perceived through the very existence ofthat absolute truth. Ifthere is a certain absolute

truth,then there are ways to live in conformity with it and ways to live out ofbalance with
it. The Sophists search for expediency rather than truth presupposes that there is no
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transcendent order but onlyjustifiable ends to pursue. The means used to reach these

expedient ends do not need the scrutiny routinely given to conduct by the person striving
to conform to a higher truth. The sophists,therefore, can take shortcuts and use means

considered reprehensible to the truth-seeker,Plato. They have no need to examine their

conscience as Plato does;the successful achievement ofthe expedient end shows them
that they have done the right thing. These two positions,Plato's and the sophists', are
mutually abhorrent. Hence, we have the great battle ofthe Phaedrns.
Frye notes that when thinking and feeling become untangled in the metonymic era,

and people begin to look at pure, unemotional thought,then abstractions become possible

and logic is bom.Logic ideally leads us to perceive that there are "valid and invalid ways
ofthinking"(7), which is exactly why Plato has Socrates teach Phaedrns by painstakingly
dissecting the differences between tmth and popular opinion. This absolute commitment to

the search for the most valid way ofthinking makes Plato the idealist,the uncompromising
dialectician, the perfect spokesman for the metonymic mindset. Curran says,"Rhetoric is

the main topic ofthe dialogue; Socrates provides the tools for rhetoric to gain
respectability, and Plato uses these tools in the structure ofhis dialogue,thus persuading

his readers"(71). These tools are the tools ofdialectic: the painstaking method ofprecise
definition ofterms,the careful organization ofthe argument and consideration ofthe
readiness ofthe soul ofthe listener to absorb and utilize the arguments presented. These
tools can raise rhetoric from the quagmire ofraw emotion onto a smooth,solid plain of

reason where a search for tmth can be earnestly conducted. Without these tools,says

Plato,rhetoric can only fiinction as the poison pharmakon,the killer ofthe very soul.
Plato's warnings about rhetoric echo down the centuries, reinforced by the sordid

parade oftyrants and demagogues who have flourished in every age ofhuman history,
administering their vilely poisoned pharmakon to unwary listeners and leaving destmction

58

and misery in their wake. Now,at the end ofthe twentieth century,there is soul-shaking
justification for Plato's distrust ofrhetoric—especially in the hands ofa politician. We have
seen what Plato could only imagine. We have witnessed rhetoric gone mad,the extreme
dark end ofthe spectrum,in speeches by Hitler. It is often said that one didn't even have

to speak the German language in order to understand Hitler's speeches. His message was
clearly and consistently one ofpoisonous hatred,an emotion as far removed from the cool

upper regions ofreason as can be found. His message was spelled out in his uncontrolled

demeanor during delivery ofhis speeches. His veins stood out, his face got red, he
screamed and brandished his fist in the air. This is what happens when feeling is so much
in command ofthought that thought is,for all practical purposes,obliterated.
So much for the orator, but what ofthe listeners? We have also seen the

nightmarishly mesmerizing effect that these vituperative speeches had on Hitler's
followers. In response to his poisonous diatribes,they seemed to slough offlike an old

skin the broad,fundamental moral and ethical standards held to be universally valid for the
human family. Many listeners ceased to be individuals with functioning consciences and
became mindless,willing conspirators in Hitler's monstrous evil, and many more looked
the other way and were silent.
But, we complacently remind ourselves,these were Germans,not Americans.

There must be an inherent flaw in their national character. We,thank God,are different. If

we take refuge in this fallacy, we have fallen precisely into the trap against which
Nietzsche warned us. We are fooling ourselves. It is our natural inclination to shield

ourselves from brutal reality, but by doing so, we risk leaving ourselves unprotected from
our very selves. We leave our dark side conveniently unexamined and therefore unfettered.
Ifwe are to learn the lessons ofPlato's dialectic, we must each look at our own

soul and reflect, meditate, wonder whether our real selfis strong enough to withstand the
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onslaught ofsuch mind-bending rhetorical persuasion. Remembering Nietzsche's
comments on the inclination ofhumans to allow themselves to be deceived, we must

weigh our real selves and be wary ofeasy answers. Where is my personal line drawn that I

would not cross for any consideration? IfI do not consider each issue very carefully, using
some ofPlato's absolutes as my landmarks,I can easily persuade myselfthat my line is

much closer to Plato's "truth" and farther from the sophists'"expediency" than it probably
is. It might be easy to quiet one's conscience and conform to popular opinion, especially
when disagreeing could bring deadly peril to selfand loved ones.
Plato saw the dangers inherent in both oral and written rhetoric at the dawn ofthe
metonymic period when many ofhis contemporaries saw only the excitement ofthe latent

persuasive power in these tools ofcommunication,not the vast potential that that power
held for either good or evil.
During the course ofthe Phaedrus,Plato has Socrates use a vast array of
rhetorical techniques,including some which seem to be incompatible,in his effort to

persuade Phaedrus to adopt truth as his guiding star instead ofemotion-driven popular
opinion. However, we have seen how each technique serves a special purpose that makes

it worthwhile for Plato/Socrates to use. We have seen the superficially incompatible polar
opposites ofmetaphor and metonymy tamed by Plato's mastery oflanguage till they
compliment and reinforce each other in this towering dialogue from ancient Greece.
Speeches, metaphors, prayers, myths and irony all cut across our flimsy fabric of
metonymic continuity in the Phaedrus. Indeed,it is almost as ifthe disparate patches of

interruptive or metaphoric techniques are lightly stitched together with the thread of
metonymy, making a sort ofcrazy quilt out ofthe finished text rather than a fabric with a

continuous pattern as we would expect in a metonymic text. However,crazy quilts are
beautifiil, creative and interesting to contemplate even though their pattern is more
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difficult to discern. The same can be said ofthe Phaedrus.

It is almost as though the interruptions ofthe metonymic flow are subliminal

messages to a Phaedrus who is not yet ready to receive this information overtly. Although
each interruption cuts across the contiguity ofthe realistic framework,they each function
as a beneficial form ofpharmakon in the hands ofSocrates,the good physician.
ThePhaedrus is an impressive example ofdialectic teaching in action, and I feel

confident that ifPhaedrus is not entirely converted at the end ofthis day,he has at least
been exposed to those critical-thinking skills that will make him a wiserjudge ofthe

rhetorical arts ofpersuasion in the future. Perhaps he is on the way toward being bom
again,this time as a philosopher.

61

Works Cited

Abrams,M.H..^4 Glossary ofLiterary Terms. Sixth Edition. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1993.

Anderson,Marlene Evangeline."A Deconstructive Analysis ofPlato's Phaedrus." Thesis.
Cal. State San Bernardino, 1991.

Saint Augustine. The Confessions ofSaint Augustine. Trans. Rex Warner. New York:
N.A.L.Penguin Inc., 1963.
Burke,Kenneth. On Symbols and Society. Chicago: U. ofChicago P., 1989.
Chen,Rong."Conversational Implicature and Poetic Metaphor." Language and
Literature. XVIII(1993): 53-74.
Curran,Jane V."The Rhetorical Technique ofPlato'sPhaedrus."Philosophy and
Rhetoric. 19(1986): 66-72.

Derrida, Jaques. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: U. ofChicago P.,
1981.

—.Margins ofPhilosophy. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U.ofChicago P., 1982.
Fish, Stanley E.Self-Consuming Artifacts. Berkeley: U. ofCalifornia P., 1972.
Frye,Northrop. The Great Code: The Bible andLiterature. San Diego: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1981.

Goody,Jack and Ian Watt."The Consequences ofLiteracy." Literacy in Traditional
Societies. Ed. Jack Goody. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1968: 27-68.
Grice,Paul H.. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1989.
Green, Georgia M.."Some Remarks on Why There is Implicature." Studies in the
Linguistic Sciences. 17.2(1987): 75-92.

Griswold, Charles L. Jr. Self-Knowledge in Plato'sPhaedrus. New Haven: Yale U.P.,
1986.

Hesiod. The Poems ofHesiod. Trans. R.M.Frazer. Norman: U. ofOklahoma P., 1983.
Havelock,Eric.Preface to Plato. Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1963.

62

Illich,Ivan and Barry Sanders.ABC The Alphabetization ofthe Popular Mind. San
Francisco; North Point Press, 1988.

Jakobson,Roman."The Metaphoric and Metonymic Poles."Modern Criticism and
Theory. Ed. David Lodge. New York: Longman, 1988. 57-61.

Lodge, David. The Modes ofModern Writing:Metaphor,Metonymy and the Typology of
Modem Literature. Chicago: U. ofChicago P., 1977.
Nietzsche, Friedrich."On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense." The Rhetorical Tradition:
Readingsfrom Classical Times to the Present. Eds. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce
Herzberg. Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1990. 888-896.

O'Connor,William Van."Irony."Princeton Encyclopedia ofPoetry andPoetics. Ed. Alex
Preminger. Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1974.

Ong,Walter J.. Orality andLiteracy: The Technologizing ofthe Word.Padstow,Eng.:
T.J. Press, 1989.

Plato. "Phaedrus." The Rhetorical Tradition:Readingsfrom Classical Times to the
Present. Eds.Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. Boston: St. Martin's Press,
1990. 113-143.

Romilly,Jacqueline de. Magic andRhetoric in Ancient Greece. Cambridge: Harvard U.
P., 1975.

Rowe,C.J..Plato:Phaedrus. Wiltshire: Aris & Phillips Ltd., 1986.

Searle,John. Expression andMeaning. Cambridge,Eng.: Cambridge U.P., 1979.
Wheelwright,Philip,

Princeton Encyclopedia ofPoetry andPoetics. Ed. Alex

Preminger. Princeton: Princeton U P., 1974.

63

